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Abstract
Positive reappraisal, a type of emotion regulation that involves cognitively
reframing negative information in a positive light, has been shown to promote resilience
in stressed individuals (i.e., it decreases depression and enhances well-being). The ability
to use positive reappraisal (PRA) varies widely across individuals, raising the question of
which cognitive functions might support this ability. Only a few studies have investigated
this question, and they have not yet examined the relationships between PRA and
executive functions that involve emotional materials (“valence-specific executive
functions;” EF). The first part of the present study examined the relationships between
PRA and two types of valence-specific EF theorized to be involved in PRA: inhibition of
negative information and working memory for positive information. A community
sample of 250 men and women (age 18 to 72 years) completed a PRA task and several
valence-specific EF tasks. Results indicated no associations between PRA and valencespecific EF. To take a step further, the second part of the study investigated whether age
moderated the relationships between PRA and valence-specific EF. Previous studies have
documented decline in cognitive function but well-preserved emotional function in old
age. This raises the question of whether the relationships between PRA and valencespecific EF change as a function of age. Regression analyses indicated an interaction
between age and inhibition of negative information, such that older adults with better
inhibition of negative information demonstrated higher PRA, whereas younger adults
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with better inhibition of negative information showed lower PRA. These results have
important implications for understanding how valence-specific EF supports PRA in
adulthood. Potential explanations, methodological and theoretical implications, and
future directions are discussed.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Emotion regulation serves a crucial role in psychological well-being (John &
Gross, 2004). Specifically, emotion regulation is important when individuals undergo
negative or stressful events. Emotion regulation “refers to the processes by which we
influence which emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience and
express them” (Gross, 2002, p. 282). For example, when experiencing a stressful life
event such as writing a dissertation, to avoid overwhelming anxiety, the person can tell
him or herself that the research topic is very interesting and the work is right on schedule,
so there is no need to be anxious. In addition, the person can start exercising and
meditating regularly and stick to a set schedule to work on the dissertation. Given that
emotion regulation is essential for psychological well-being, the impairment of emotion
regulation is closely related to various types of psychopathology, such as depression and
anxiety (Gross & Muñoz, 1995).
Reappraisal
Reappraisal, a cognitive reframing strategy to change initial emotional responses,
is one of the most commonly used emotion regulation strategies. More specifically,
reappraisal involves cognitively reframing the appraisal of emotional stimuli. Other
commonly used strategies include suppression (Gross & John, 2003) and distraction
(McRae et al., 2010). Reappraisal has been demonstrated as an effective way to regulate
emotions, in terms of subjective feelings and peripheral physiological response
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(sympathetic activation). For example, individuals who use reappraisal to down-regulate
the negative emotions elicited by a negative film, reported a greater decrease in
subjective feelings of negative emotions coupled with less sympathetic activation
compared to individuals who use suppression to regulate emotions (Gross, 1998; Gross,
2002; Gross & John, 2003; Hofmann, Heering, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2009).
In addition to its effectiveness in regulating emotions, reappraisal has several
other advantages. First, reappraisal has been documented to preserve better cognitive
performance than suppression. One important difference between reappraisal and
suppression is the amount of regulatory effort that’s required in the process. Suppression
involves continual self-monitoring and self-correction to conceal one’s feelings. It
demands a great deal of cognitive resources and thus is relatively taxing (Richards,
Butler, & Gross, 2003). In contrast, because reappraisal intervenes in the emotional
process before emotions become full-fledged (Gross, 1998), the subsequent regulatory
effort for reappraisal becomes less burdensome (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003),
and thus mental resources can be devoted to tasks that happen simultaneously with or
immediately after the reappraisal. This explains why people who use reappraisal while
performing cognitive tasks exhibit better performance than people who use suppression.
As an illustration, in a study during which individuals’ memory performance was tested
after participating in an emotion regulation task (instructed to suppress or reappraise
while watching emotion-eliciting slides), reappraisers showed better memory regarding
the information about the character in the slide than suppressors (Richards & Gross,
2000, study 2). Memory advantages for reappraisers versus suppressors were also
replicated in a conversational context where a dating couple discussed relationship issues;
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reappraisers reported a greater number of immediate recalls of the conversation than
suppressors (Richards et al., 2003).
Second, reappraisal has important positive implications for individuals’ social
outcomes: Reappraisal increases the quality of social interaction and social intimacy in
interpersonal relationships, relative to suppression. One potential mechanism that leads
reappraisers and suppressers to diverge on social outcomes is the differential cognitive
demand involved in the regulatory process (Butler et al., 2003). The high cognitive
demand in suppression distracts individuals from the conversation and subsequently
impedes individuals from responding to their conversation partner. In addition to less
responsiveness, suppressing emotional expression disrupts the interactive process of
communicating emotions and feelings, which decreases social intimacy in interpersonal
relationships. In contrast, the lower cognitive demand allows reappraisers to respond
more freely and frequently to their conversation partners (Butler et al., 2003). They are
also more willing to share emotions openly with others (Gross & John, 2003, study 4). In
turn, the conversation partners of reappraisers reported a higher level of rapport and
experienced less stress (i.e., reduced cardiovascular response) (Butler et al., 2003).
Overall, the quality of social interaction is higher for reappraisers than suppressors. As a
consequence, reappraisers are more likely to have a closer interpersonal relationship and
are liked more by their peers than suppressors (Gross & John, 2003, study 4).
Third, reappraisal promotes an overall positive emotional profile. A large-scale
survey showed that in daily life, individuals who use reappraisal more frequently (high
reappraisers) experience and express more positive emotions, and fewer negative
emotions than individuals who use reappraisal less frequently (low reappraisers) (Gross
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& John, 2003, study 3). Similar results were obtained in a lab paradigm where a strong
negative emotion (anger) was induced. High reappraisers experienced more positive
emotions and fewer negative emotions than low reappraisers (Mauss, Cook, Cheng, &
Gross, 2005). As can be seen, both a large-scale survey and a lab study showed that
individuals who frequently use reappraisal experience a higher level of positive emotions
and a lower level of negative emotions.
Fourth, over the long term, reappraisal enhances individuals’ psychological wellbeing. The use of reappraisal has been shown to be associated with greater life
satisfaction and fewer depressive symptoms (Gross & John, 2003, study 5). Particularly,
when encountering stressful life events, reappraisal protects stressed individuals against
depression. More effective reappraisal use is associated with fewer depressive symptoms
when individuals are in high stress situations (Troy, Wilhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss,
2010). In summary, reappraisal is an effective emotion regulation strategy associated
with positive cognitive, socio-emotional and health outcomes. Overall, reappraisal
contributes significantly to an individual’s psychological well-being.
Types of reappraisal. Reappraisal involves cognitive reframing of emotional
experiences to exert better control over initial emotional responses (Shiota & Levenson,
2009). To reduce the effect of emotional responses, reappraisal directs one’s focus inward
to modify one’s own thoughts and emotional experience. Reappraisal is a flexible
strategy, which can be implemented in different ways, as demonstrated by various
instructions across studies (McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2011).
Taking this line of research further, a distinction was made between two types of
reappraisal: detached versus positive. In the short term, both detached and positive
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reappraisal strategies were shown to be effective in down-regulating negative emotions
(Ochsner et al., 2004; Shiota & Levenson, 2009) and up-regulating positive emotions
(McRae et al., 2011). In the long term, both were associated with a higher level of
subjective well-being (Gross & John, 2003; Shiota, 2006) and resilience against stress
(Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004). Importantly, however, these two strategies operate
differently based on the types of reasoning that are recruited.
Detached reappraisal involves reframing negative events in a detached manner by
analyzing a negative experience objectively or technically (Gross, 1998). For example,
when watching a frightening movie, people could tell themselves that a disturbing scene
is not real, but the result of theatrical effect. Detached reappraisal has been used in
numerous experiments on emotion regulation (e.g., Beauregard, Lévesque, & Bourgouin,
2001; Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2007; Lévesque et al., 2004; Ochsner, Bunge,
Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002). In contrast, positive reappraisal is defined as reinterpreting
negative information in a positive light by adopting a positive perspective, generating a
positive thought, or finding positive meaning in the midst of a stressful event (Troy et al.,
2010; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2007). This strategy is often described in self-help books or
fortune cookies, such as “every uphill has a downhill” or “every cloud has a silver
lining.”
Positive reappraisal. In a real-life scenario, positive reappraisal would seem to be
more adaptive than detached reappraisal, particularly in dealing with events of high
personal significance. For example, when a beloved family member is dying, people
cannot simply distance themselves from the event or experience the event objectively or
technically, as one could do while watching a sad movie (i.e., detached reappraisal).
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Doing so would be akin to denial or avoidance, and is not a realistic or adaptive approach
to regulate emotions in the long term. In contrast, people who use positive reappraisal
identify the negative aspect in the first place (e.g., yes, it is sad), but mainly focus on the
positive aspect of the event. Positive reappraisal of a sad event (such as a death in the
family) would be considering, for example, that the person you care for deeply no longer
has to suffer, has lived a long and happy life, now rests in peace in the company of family
and close friends, or might bring the family closer together. In summary, the appropriate
use of positive reappraisal in negative events allows people to have closure on events that
could otherwise cause intense and lingering distress. In other words, people can carry
positive thoughts away from an otherwise distressing event and adopt a healthy outlook
to enhance their well-being in life (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004).
In the present study, I focus solely on positive reappraisal. One important
function of positive reappraisal is to generate and maintain positive emotions when an
individual is in the midst of a negative context (Folkman, 1997; Folkman & Moskowitz,
2000; Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003). The emergence of positive
emotions in a negative context might seem counterintuitive, or even inappropriate, but
studies have shown that amidst the hardship, positive emotions coexist with negative
emotions (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000; Fredrickson et al., 2003), and the frequency of
positive emotions is comparable to the frequency of negative emotions (see Folkman,
2008, for review).
Positive emotions. It has been suggested that positive emotions preserve an
individual’s psychological well-being in a stressful condition, build up ego resilience
(Cohn, Fredrickson, Brown, Mikels, & Conway, 2009), and facilitate the feeling of
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meaningfulness in life (King, Hicks, Krull, & Del Gaiso, 2006). In addition, positive
emotions generated in a negative context are associated with decreasing risks for
depression (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2007) and with personal growth in terms of
increasing psychological resources (optimism, life satisfaction, and tranquility) when
measured before and after the negative event (Fredrickson et al., 2003).
These remarkable effects of positive emotions are illustrated and explained by the
broaden-and-build theory, which posits that positive emotions broaden one’s thoughtaction repertoire and build personal resources. Individuals who experience positive
emotions are characterized by a global rather than local focus, suggesting that their
attention is broadened. While one’s awareness and attention are enhanced and expanded,
individuals are prone to engage in a more flexible and creative way of thinking and
problem solving (Fredrickson, 2003). As a result, individuals are more likely to seek new
experiences and actively approach other people to create or enhance social bonds. Over
time, these actions build up personal resources, including skill development, social
relations, physical health, and resilience, which in turn increase the likelihood of
experiencing more positive emotions. Thus, positive emotions initiate a cycle of more
positive emotions, leading toward enhanced well-being and many other advantages
associated with positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2001, 2004). In summary, employing
positive reappraisal in negative contexts enhances the likelihood of positive emotions,
which are associated with optimal psychological well-being and social outcomes.
The majority of emotion regulation research has focused on individual differences
in the decrement of negative emotions rather than on the enhancement of positive
emotions (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000). This could be due to the following reasons.
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First, positive emotions are more difficult to study than negative emotions. Fredrickson
(2003) stated that positive emotions are not easily differentiated from each other and are
lacking in distinguishable physiological markers. Second, the field of psychological
health has a long-held tradition honoring the medical model with the focus on
psychopathology, and most psychopathology is characterized by prolonged or intensified
negative emotions. Third, people are biased in attending to negative emotions because
many of the negative emotions are directly related to survival function (Folkman, 2008).
For example, the emotion of fear alerts individuals the presence of danger, and thus
increases the likelihood of avoiding dangerous situations and staying alive. Positive
emotions, on the other hand, are not related to immediate survival function. Therefore,
positive emotions are often overlooked in a negative context.
To fully understand the effect of positive reappraisal on emotional experience, I
argue that positive emotions deserve equal attention as negative emotions generated in a
negative context. Therefore, this study focuses on the experience of positive emotions as
the result of positive reappraisal. In particular, the emotions of happiness, love, and
optimism are my variables of interest because these positive emotions are the targeted
emotions in positive reappraisal.
Reappraisal ability. A majority of reappraisal studies investigate trait
reappraisal, which is measured by individuals’ self-report on their habitual use of
reappraisal in daily life. For example, individuals rate the degree to which they endorse
the following statement: “I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the
situation I’m in” (Gross & John, 2003). The higher endorsement of the item indicates that
individuals have higher trait reappraisal. Trait reappraisal has been documented to be
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positively associated with health outcomes. Overall, trait reappraisal has contributed
significantly to the body of knowledge in reappraisal; however, it turns out to be a less
precise measure because it measures a collection of different aspects about reappraisal,
such as the frequency, the motivation, and the ability of reappraisal use (Troy et al.,
2010).
To differentiate these three aspects of reappraisal use, it is important to devise
different measures that aim to examine each aspect of reappraisal. Researchers first
focused on the ability of reappraisal use. They empirically examined individuals’ actual
ability to regulate emotions after using reappraisal in a lab setting. The effectiveness of
using reappraisal to regulate emotions is referred to as cognitive reappraisal ability (Troy
et al., 2010). Cognitive reappraisal ability was operationalized as subjects’ self-ratings on
changes in their emotional experience (negative emotions in particular) between
unregulated and reappraisal conditions, when subjects received specific instructions to
reappraise (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2011; Troy et al., 2010). Cognitive
reappraisal ability has been shown to be an important predictor of mental health.
Specifically, it has been shown to protect highly stressed individuals from escalating their
depressive levels and thus enhance their psychological well-being (McRae et al., 2011;
Troy et al., 2010). This critical reappraisal ability appears to vary considerably among
individuals (McRae et al., 2011; Troy et al., 2010).
The wide range of individual differences in reappraisal ability leads to a critical
question: What mechanisms or processes might support this important ability to
reappraise? This question is important because of its theoretical significance and
implications. First, on a theoretical level, it can enhance our understanding of the
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psychological processes involved in positive reappraisal. Second, from a practical
perspective, identifying the supporting mechanisms or processes of positive reappraisal
ability can potentially help individuals with low or impaired emotion regulatory function
better utilize reappraisal when it is context-appropriate. More specifically, more effective
intervention programs could be developed to train these individuals to use reappraisal in
dealing with stress. Therefore, when considering both theoretical and practical aspects,
investigating the supporting mechanism of reappraisal ability can potentially provide a
unique contribution towards optimizing mental health.
Reappraisal and Executive Function
Positive reappraisal requires individuals to reinterpret negative events in a more
positive light. This process involves high-level cognitive control abilities. Executive
function (EF), which is among high-level cognitive control abilities, includes components
that mirror the process of positive reappraisal. Thus, EF becomes a very promising
candidate for the process to support positive reappraisal.
Subcomponents of EF. To further investigate how EF supports the processes in
positive reappraisal, I first want to note the complex nature of EF. Housed in the
prefrontal cortex, EF has been generally accepted as a unitary and also diverse construct
(Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). EF is regarded as a set of high-level
cognitive control abilities, including inhibition, working memory, and set shifting. These
three subcomponents have been shown to correlate moderately with one another
(correlation coefficients ranging from 0.42 to 0.63) but are also separate from one another
(Miyake et al., 2000). Some researchers include cognitive flexibility as another
subcomponent of EF (Fisk & Sharp, 2004; Gyurak et al., 2009; Lezak, 2004). Cognitive
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flexibility is understood as the ability to generate responses quickly to meet
predetermined rules. This component is often examined via verbal fluency tasks, which
measure, for example, the number of words starting with the letter “A” that an individual
can generate within a brief period (e.g., a minute). However, other researchers do not
consider cognitive flexibility as the fourth subcomponent of EF because cognitive
flexibility relies broadly on brain regions other than the frontal lobe. Some neural
evidence showed that verbal fluency involves cortical and sub-cortical regions, including
the temporal cortex (Troyer, Moscovitch, Winocur, Alexander, & Stuss, 1998) and the
basal ganglia (Stuss et al., 1998). Thus, it is arguable that cognitive flexibility is not part
of the EF because cognitive flexibility is not based on the processes shared by the three
subcomponents of EF mentioned above. To be consistent with the common view of EF in
the literature, I only discuss the three generally accepted subcomponents of EF:
inhibition, working memory, and set shifting.
Inhibition. Inhibition refers to the ability to suppress prepotent, automatic
responses when necessary. Inhibition serves as an important information gatekeeper—
allowing the access of goal-relevant information and preventing goal-irrelevant
information from entering the working memory (Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999). Multiple
tasks have developed to examine inhibition. For example, the color Stroop task has been
used broadly across studies to measure inhibition. Participants are presented with color
words printed in incongruent color inks (e.g., the word “red” printed in blue instead of
red ink) and asked to name the ink color. This task requires participants to attend to the
ink color while inhibiting the prepotent impulse to read the word. This type of inhibition
is known as the prepotent response inhibition (Friedman & Miyake, 2004).
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In addition, researchers have proposed that inhibition is not a unitary component
and involves several subcomponents (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). One subcomponent—
the negative priming effect—is, by definition, the delayed response to the target stimulus
as a result of inhibiting a similar stimulus in the previous trial, while this similar stimulus
was treated as an irrelevant distractor in the previous trial (Joormann, 2004, 2010; Tipper,
1985). This subcomponent, which reflects inhibition, has been extensively studied (for
review, see Fox, 1995; Tipper, 2001). More recently, individual differences in the
negative priming effect (for negative materials) have been found to relate to the habitual
use of emotion regulation strategies, such that better inhibition on negative materials is
associated with more frequent use of reappraisal and less frequent use of suppression
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2010).
In the context of reappraisal, inhibition is crucial in preventing individuals from
perseverating on the salient but irrelevant features of the stimuli. Deficits in inhibition
could lead to the failure to attend to or process task-relevant information and thus impede
generating more adaptive appraisals with positive aspects (Joormann, 2010). For
example, using reappraisal to lessen the emotional impact after reading Romeo & Juliet,
individuals need to inhibit the focus on the tragic ending while trying to generate
alternative appraisals. In summary, inhibition (of negative materials) is suggested to be a
key component in positive reappraisal.
Working memory. Working memory (WM) is the ability to store, update, and
manipulate relevant information in short-term memory to serve a particular goal
(Baddeley, 1986). WM differs from short-term memory in that it is not just about
passively encoding and storing information, but also entails active processing (updating
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and manipulating information). Therefore, WM is measured by tasks that involve both
storage and processing. A key feature of the WM system is that the system has limited
capacity, so the resources are divided between storage and processing (Bopp &
Verhaeghen, 2005). One of many commonly used WM tasks is the backward word span
task (Bryan & Luszcz, 1996; Passolunghi, Vercelloni, & Schadee, 2007), which is
modified from the backward digit span used in Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—
Revised (Wechsler, 1981). The backward word span task requires participants to recite a
list of words in reverse order soon after they hear them. In addition to remembering
increasing numbers of words (storage), participants also need to keep track of the
temporal sequence of the list (update) and reorder the list in a reverse fashion
(manipulation). In previous research, WM has been shown to positively correlate with the
self-control ability (Black, Semple, Pokhrel, & Grenard, 2011) and the effectiveness of
reappraisal use in terms of modulating emotional experience (McRae et al., 2011;
Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008).
In the context of reappraisal, WM allows individuals to keep relevant information
online, to update it in a timely fashion, and to manipulate it in a way that conforms to
emotional goals (to preserve emotional well-being). An impairment or low capacity in
WM could hinder the process of generating alternative appraisals or evaluating the
current situation. Therefore, WM is suggested to be the second key component in positive
reappraisal and to work in tandem with inhibition ability.
Set shifting. Set shifting involves conscious shifting between different sets of
rules, instructions, or operations (Monsell, 2003). It is important to note that set shifting
is not synonymous with attention shifting (Miyake et al., 2000). Attention shifting
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involves attention allocation and deployment, and can be achieved by making voluntary
eye movements or covertly reorienting visual attention; set shifting involves a more
deliberate process that involves conscious awareness of certain rules, instructions or
operations. Set shifting abilities are typically measured by having participants shift focus
between two sets of rules, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task. This task requires
participants to sort through a deck of stimulus cards (printed with various shapes, colors,
or quantities) based on immediate feedback (correct or incorrect) from the test
administrator. At some point during the task, the sorting rule changes, and participants
have to generate a few alternative rules and test them out respectively to see which new
rule would apply in the current situation. To succeed, participants have to adopt the new
rule immediately without perseverating on the old ones.
In the context of reappraisal, I argue that set shifting is less relevant for the
following reasons. First, set shifting is a specific and deliberate cognitive process, which
requires shifting between explicit sets of rules and revising rules based on external
feedback. In contrast, reappraisal is more of an internal dialogue than a task guided by
rules and external feedback. Second, frequent switching between multiple thoughts (i.e., a
low switching cost) could reflect flexible thinking; however, it could also be an indication
of ineffective reappraisal. This is because frequent switching between thoughts may
imply that the mind is cluttered with information and has difficulty filtering out irrelevant
or less useful information. Thus, what set-shifting ability can predict is not clear. Lastly,
from a practical perspective, I tried to minimize the participants’ burden by avoiding too
many tasks at once—too many cognitive tasks in succession can wear out participants
and thus lead to inaccurate test results. To sum up, for both theoretical and practical
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reasons, this current study focuses on two subcomponents of the EF—inhibition and
WM.
Evidence for the contribution of EF to reappraisal. Neuroimaging work on
reappraisal suggests EF is involved in the process of reappraisal. For example, the dorsal
medial and lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) were found to be activated during reappraisal.
These regions have been documented to be responsible for two subcomponents of EF—
inhibition and WM. In addition, the left ventral lateral PFC was inversely correlated with
emotion processing regions, such as the amygdala and the medial orbital frontal cortex,
demonstrating the engagement of reappraisal to down-regulate negative emotions
(Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Taken together, these findings lead
to the conclusion that two subcomponents of EF (inhibition and WM) contribute to the
reappraisal process wherein emotions are regulated.
Limitations of previous studies and the focus of present research. There are
four major limitations from previous studies. First, reappraisal is often studied in the
construct of trait reappraisal, which can be very different from the actual ability to use
reappraisal (i.e., reappraisal ability) because trait reappraisal combines several
components of reappraisal—motivation, frequency, and ability. Studies have shown that
these two constructs are modestly correlated, at best (McRae et al., 2011; Troy et al.,
2010). Therefore, in this study I focus on reappraisal ability rather than trait reappraisal to
get a clean measure of individuals’ ability to use reappraisal.
Second, the majority of studies on reappraisal focus on detached reappraisal,
leaving positive reappraisal underexplored. Positive reappraisal is an effective and
adaptive emotion regulation strategy, especially when individuals face negative events
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that bear personal significance. Thus, to supplement our knowledge of this adaptive but
less-studied strategy, my study focuses on positive reappraisal.
Third, most studies on reappraisal or emotion regulation use the down-regulation
of negative emotions as the indicator of reappraisal ability (McRae et al., 2011; Troy et
al., 2010). I propose that positive emotions are equally important as negative emotions—
positive emotions always coexist with negative emotions and are positively associated
with psychological well-being and optimal health outcomes (Fredrickson et al., 2003).
Thus, I choose to use the up-regulation of positive emotions—positive reappraisal ability
(PRA)—as the index of reappraisal ability in this study.
Fourth, no empirical studies have examined the relationships between reappraisal
and EF with emotional materials (i.e., valence-specific EF) (c.f. McRae et al., 2011;
Schmeichel et al., 2008). EF is generally examined with non-emotional materials, such as
alphabet (e.g., digit span), numbers (e.g., operation span), neutral words (e.g., the color
Stroop task), or perceptual stimuli (e.g., colors or brightness in Mikels, Larkin, ReuterLorenz, & Carstensen, 2005). However, examining valence-specific EF is important in
the context of positive reappraisal and the reasons are illustrated as follows.
The importance of valence-specific EF in positive reappraisal. First and
foremost, emotional materials are the main ingredients being processed by positive
reappraisal. Positive reappraisal involves dual processes of inhibiting negative
information and storing, updating, and manipulating positive information (i.e., inhibition
of negative information and WM for positive information; see Figure 1). Thus, valencespecific EF is a more relevant and sensitive measure when it comes to investigating the
high-level cognitive processes that might support PRA.
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Second, previous studies have demonstrated that emotional materials are
processed differently from non-emotional ones: People direct attention toward emotional
materials faster than neutral ones (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) and have better
memories for emotional materials than neutral ones (Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002;
Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). Better memories mean that people are not only more likely
to remember emotional information than neutral information, but also remember the
contextual details of emotional information more vividly. The increased attention and
memory performance in emotional information (as compared to neutral information) is
called the emotion salience effect (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008), which has shown to be
related to the amygdala. Better memory for emotional materials is correlated with a
higher glucose metabolism rate in the amygdala (Cahill et al., 1996), and damages to the
amygdala have been shown to offset the emotion salience effect (Adolphs, Cahill, Schul,
& Babinsky, 1997). Therefore, different attention and memory performance in emotional
versus non-emotional materials suggest the need to examine valence-specific EF.
Third, research about psychopathology suggested that high-level cognitive
processes with emotional materials are better predictors for emotional dysregulation than
cognitive processes involving non-emotional materials. Studies have shown that some
clinical populations process emotional materials differently from non-clinical
populations. For example, Joormann et al. (2004, 2006) found that depressive patients
exhibited deficits in inhibiting negative materials but not neutral materials. Similarly,
Levens and Gotlib (2010) found that depressive participants had the tendency to keep
negative information active in their WM (a negative bias) as compared to their neverbeen-depressed counterparts, who exhibited the opposite pattern (a positive bias) when
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processing emotional materials. Thus, because cognitive processes with emotional
materials more accurately predict and reflect the impairment of emotion regulation than
those with non-emotional materials, valence-specific EF should be considered when
examining PRA.
Taken together, three important factors suggest that valence-specific EF should be
considered when examining its relationship to positive reappraisal: Emotional materials
are the essential elements in positive reappraisal; emotional versus non-emotional
materials are processed differently; and cognitive processes involving emotional
materials better reflect the impairment of emotion regulatory function than cognitive
processes involving non-emotional materials. Therefore, in this study, two
subcomponents of EF with valence-specific information (i.e., neutral, positive, and
negative valence) are used to address the question of which valence-specific EF might
support PRA.
Hypotheses I.
1.1 Inhibition of negative information will positively correlate with PRA. In
contrast, inhibition of neutral information or inhibition of positive information will not
correlate with PRA.
1.2 WM for positive information will positively correlate with PRA. In contrast,
WM for neutral information or WM for negative information will not correlate with PRA.
Age, Executive Function, and Positive Reappraisal Ability
The term aging often comes with negative connotations—such as weakness,
inability, and dysfunctional—and the long-held perception of irrevocable loss experience
in a number of areas, including physical health, mental condition, and social relationships
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(Smith & Bates, 1997). With the high prevalence of negative events, old age is often
portrayed as a life stage rife with reduced emotional functioning, such as dampened affect.
However, I argue that within this dense cloud of decline and loss, there is still a
silver lining shimmering in the aging process: Emotional aging. Emotional development
in adulthood is unique in that it does not parallel the path of physical and cognitive
development, which peak in late adolescence and early adulthood, remain fairly stable in
midlife and decline in old age (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000).
Instead, emotional development (in terms of emotional functioning and emotional wellbeing) seems to remain stable or even advance with age (Carstensen, Fung, & Charles,
2003). In the following, I review emotional and cognitive aging in more detail because
emotion and cognition are intricately intertwined (as described in the first part of this
study), and they continue to be the main variables of interest in the second part of the
study.
Emotional aging. A growing body of empirical studies on life-span development
have noted this aging paradox: Despite many undesirable aspects observed during the
aging process, such as physical decline, cognitive degradation, and social loss, emotional
functioning (i.e., experience, regulation) and emotional well-being do not appear to be
compromised—at least not until a very late stage of life (Kryla-Lighthall & Mather,
2008; Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010).
First, emotional experience has been studied in terms of intensity and frequency
across ages. Regarding intensity, in lab experiments older adults reported comparable
emotional intensity in both positive emotions (e.g., amusement in Tsai, Levenson, &
Carstensen, 2000) and negative emotions (e.g., sadness in Kunzmann & Grühn, 2005;
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disgust in Seider, Shiota, Whalen, & Levenson, 2011) to their younger counterparts in
response to emotion-eliciting films. Consistently, in a large-scale survey about daily
emotions, older adults reported similar levels of intensity in various positive and negative
emotions as younger adults (Carstensen et al., 2000, study 1). Regarding frequency (the
proportions that participants experience positive or negative emotions in a period of
time), older adults reported experiencing positive emotions as often as younger adults
across various situations; interestingly, older adults reported experiencing fewer negative
emotions than younger adults across situations. The decline in frequency of negative
emotions ceased around the age of 60, after which the frequency of negative emotions in
daily life increased mildly for the rest of the adulthood. A large-scale survey revealed a
similar age-related decline in frequency of negative emotions, but at a later age: Older
adults (60 years and over) experienced depressed emotions less frequently than younger
adults (18 to 30 years) during the year before the survey was taken (Lawton, Kleban, &
Dean, 1993). A recent longitudinal study also found an age-related increase in frequency
of positive emotions (Carstensen et al., 2010). Taken together, the intensity of positive
and negative emotions appears to remain stable across adulthood. The frequency of
emotional experience suggests a stable trajectory for positive emotions and a declining
trajectory for negative emotions throughout most of the adulthood.
Second, emotion regulation appears to improve and become more effective with
age. The increased emotion regulation might explain why older adults experience positive
emotions more frequently than younger adults. Older adults are more likely to maintain
positive emotional states and to avoid negative emotional states across situations over
time than younger adults. In addition, the flexibility of moving from a high negative
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emotional state to a low negative emotional state was positively correlated with
advancing age in adults aged 18 to 60. This age-related increase in emotion regulation,
however, was not observed after age 60 (Carstensen et al., 2000, study 3). In terms of the
effectiveness of emotion regulation, older adults appeared to regulate their emotions more
strategically and flexibly in response to specific emotions and contexts (BlanchardFields, 2007).
Third, emotional well-being is often characterized by “the relative presence of
positive affect, absence of negative affect, and satisfaction with life” (Myers & Diener,
1995, p.11). A number of studies indicated that emotional well-being is relatively stable
across ages: Older adults reported a similar level of well-being as middle-aged or
younger adults, despite the physical constraints and social loss experienced in late
adulthood (Baltes & Baltes, 1990); they also did not feel more or less satisfied with life
than younger adults (Inglehart, 1990; Myers & Diener, 1995). In addition, some studies
suggest that emotional well-being increases with age: Positive emotions increased in a
quadratic fashion with age, and negative emotions decreased linearly up to age 74
(Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). This piece of evidence resonates with Carstensen et al.
(2000), which showed an age-related increase in the frequency of positive emotions and
an age-related decrease in the frequency of negative emotions experienced in daily life.
To sum up, emotional functioning during the normal aging process is well preserved and
might even improve. Relevant theories about emotional aging are introduced in the next
three paragraphs.
Socio-emotional selective theory. To explain the emotional aging in life-span
development, socio-emotional selective theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999)
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suggests individuals’ perception of time over the course of adulthood shifts their
motivation to prioritize goals. Younger adults perceive time as expansive or unlimited;
thus, they tend to focus on task-oriented goals and invest resources and energy into tasks
or activities that could broaden their horizons and potentially benefit them in the future
(e.g., pursuing an academic degree, career, or new experiences). In contrast, older adults
perceive their remaining time as limited. Given this limited time perspective as a result of
aging, older adults tend to shift away from task-oriented goals to emotional goals (e.g., to
increase emotional well-being).
Prioritizing emotional goals over task-oriented goals in old age further motivates
older adults to allocate mental and behavioral resources, such as attention and memory
(Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003) to process emotional materials in ways that
conform to their emotional goals. This allows older adults to experience higher levels of
positive emotions and lower levels of negative emotions than younger adults. In addition,
the emphasis on emotional goals also motivates older adults to recruit effective emotion
regulation strategies, which also enhances positive emotions and decreases negative
emotions (Carstensen et al., 2003). This motivational account explains why older adults
tend to keep a smaller but closer social circle (e.g., Lang, 2001) to maintain emotionally
meaningful relationships and decrease the likelihood of encountering or experiencing
negative emotions (Carstensen et al., 1999). In summary, the socio-emotional selective
theory contends that older adults are motivated in enhancing their emotional well-being.
Dynamic-interaction theory. In addition to the motivational shift in adulthood as
an explanation for emotional aging, Labouvie-Vief (2003, 2009) proposed an alternative
account, dynamic-interaction theory, which emphasizes the role of cognitive-affective
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complexity in emotional development across the lifespan. Cognitive-affective complexity
refers to the integration and growth of emotion understanding, leading to the
understanding of self. Beginning in adolescence and lasting until mid-adulthood,
individuals develop the ability to understand and integrate more complex emotions,
particularly mixed emotions (e.g., bittersweet). They also gain more insight into their
own emotional states, which facilitates developing self-identity (as being an independent
individual). The cognitive-affective complexity decreases around the early 60s.
Dynamic-interaction theory contends that the seemingly well-preserved emotional
well-being in late adulthood (i.e., high levels of positive emotions and low levels of
negative emotions) is not an indication of increased resilience in older adults, but a
reflection of reduced cognitive-affective complexity. The decreased cognitive-affective
complexity implies a decreased ability to integrate negative affect into the daily
emotional profile. As a consequence, older adults may find negative emotions less
tolerable and try to regulate based on their declined cognitive resources. To succeed in
regulation, older adults might prefer strategies like optimization to increase positive
emotions rather than combating with negative emotions. Optimization is thus suggested
as an emotion regulation strategy to compensate for the age-related decline in cognitiveaffective complexity. Taken together, reduced cognitive-affective complexity with age
facilitates employing optimization to regulate emotions, leading to the positive emotional
profile in late adulthood.
Knowledge of emotions and emotion regulation. Furthermore, it is possible that
life-long learning and practice assist older adults to be better at anticipating and
regulating emotions, which further benefit their emotional well-being. That is, with
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accumulated life experience, older adults are more knowledgeable about the effect of
emotions (Scheibe, Mata, & Carstensen, 2011). They are as accurate as their younger
counterparts in predicting their emotional responses following an emotion-eliciting event,
but older adults have shown better predictions in their arousal levels than younger adults
(Nielsen, Knutson, & Carstensen, 2008). Older adults also report higher levels of
confidence in controlling their emotions (Gross et al., 1997).
In addition, emotion regulation processes also become less effortful for older
adults (Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009): They appear to be more strategic in dealing
with daily life stressors, such that they tailor problem-solving strategies contingent upon
the context and adopt multiple strategies, including both instrumental and emotion
regulation strategies (Blanchard-Fields, 2007). That is, older adults can quickly identify
cases when there is no quick fix for certain problems; instead of solely engaging in
problem-solving behaviors, they also recruit strategies to regulate emotions at the same
time to preserve emotional well-being. In summary, as a result of abundant knowledge
and experience in emotion regulation, older adults seem to better master the skill of
selecting appropriate emotion regulation strategies based on contexts.
Summary. Overall, older adults exhibit well-preserved emotional functioning,
including emotional experience, emotion regulation ability, and emotional well-being.
They are motivated to prioritize emotional goals over task-oriented goals and to devote
resources to emotion regulation to preserve well-being. Optimization, a useful strategy
for dealing with age-related decline in cognitive- affective complexity, is one of the few
emotion regulation strategies seen in late adulthood. In addition, accumulated emotion-
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related knowledge helps older adults to be better at regulating emotions. Therefore, I
predict to see PRA increase with age (Hypothesis 2.1).
Furthermore, this unique positive emotional profile in older adults leads to an
important question: Do the relationships between PRA and valence-specific EF change as
a function of age? To approach this question, the first step is to understand the
developmental trajectory of valence-specific EF (inhibition and WM) in adulthood.
Cognitive aging. Cognitive aging has been regarded as an insidious, inevitable,
and irrevocable consequence of aging. In particular, the decline in high-level cognitive
function (the EF) carried out by the PFC is the first and most noticeable sign of cognitive
aging. It has consistently suggested that the PFC is a more susceptible target of aging
than any other brain region. Studies have shown reduced volume, rapid decline of grey
matter density (Sowell et al., 2003), decreased white matter density (Grieve, Williams,
Paul, Clark, & Gordon, 2007), and reduced cerebral blood flow in the PFC compared to
other brain regions (Gur, Gur, Obrist, Skolnick, & Rei-vitch, 1987), as well as diminished
connectivity between the PFC and other brain regions in older adults (Sullivan &
Pfefferbaum, 2006). These age-related changes in the PFC are manifested through
decreased performance in EF.
However, it is important to note that EF is a complex system comprised of a
number of subcomponents and each subcomponent of EF does not deteriorate at the same
rate (MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002). Therefore, regarding the two
subcomponents of EF that I specifically focus on in this study—inhibition and WM—I
predict a differential declining rate of EF in old age. The following paragraphs further
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discuss age effects on inhibition and WM as they pertain to the valence-specific
information being processed.
Inhibition and aging. According to the inhibitory deficit theory of cognitive
aging (Hasher & Zacks, 1988), older adults are more susceptible to interference and thus
show reduced efficiency in inhibiting irrelevant information. Consistent with this theory,
previous studies have found age differences in the negative priming effect: Younger
adults (age 18 to 22) demonstrated the negative priming effect (of letters or three-letter
words) whereas older adults (age 62 to 75) did not (Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Rypma,
1991; Kane, Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Connelly, 1994).
However, not all of the existing evidence shows an age-related decline in
inhibition (McDowd, 1997; Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, & Logan, 1994). For example,
Connelly and Hasher (1993) found equivalent negative priming effects in younger and
older adults in tasks requiring the participants to identify the location rather than the
identity of the stimuli. They proposed that age-related decline in the negative priming
effect could be driven by the stimulus type, and they further argued that inhibitory
processes are not unitary. In addition, the negative priming effect in older adults was
found in samples with relatively high intelligence scores (Kramer et al., 1994; Sullivan &
Faust, 1993). The older adult sample in Kramer et al. (1994) had intelligence scores one
standard deviation above the population mean, and the older adult sample in Sullivan and
Faust (1993) had intelligence scores higher than the age norm. Consistently, the most
recent meta-analysis examining executive control across adulthood showed the absence
of age-related decline in inhibition across studies: Older adults did not perform more
poorly than younger adults in these inhibitory tasks after taking into account age
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differences in baseline performance, but older adults did perform more poorly in
switching tasks and dual tasks (Verhaeghen, 2011). The study argued that only specific
executive control abilities decline with age, and inhibition is not one of them.
Taken together, based on the literature summarized above, the majority of studies
and more recent studies on inhibition across adulthood point to a well-preserved
inhibitory process in older adults. In addition, the characteristics of the older adults in my
sample appeared to show relatively equivalent education levels (i.e., college) and higher
vocabulary scores relative to their younger counterparts. This is similar to the sample
characteristics in Kramer et al. (1994). Therefore, I predict that inhibition of neutral
information (measured by the negative priming task) will not differ across age
(Hypothesis 2.2a).
Inhibition of valence-specific information and aging. Inhibition of valencespecific information (inhibition of negative and positive information) is often studied as a
part of emotional processes in cases of psychopathology (e.g., Joormann, 2004; Williams,
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996) but has not been examined extensively in the context of
aging. Only three studies have investigated inhibition of valence-specific information
across adulthood, using either the negative affective priming task (e.g., Goeleven, De
Raedt, & Dierckx, 2010) or the emotional Stroop task (e.g., Ashley & Swick, 2009;
Wurm, Labouvie-Vief, Aycock, Rebucal, & Koch, 2004).
Findings from these three studies on inhibition of valence-specific information are
mixed. Goeleven et al. (2010) found that older adults exhibited lower levels of inhibition
of negative information than younger adults, and no difference was found in inhibition of
positive information between older and younger adults. The other two studies using the
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emotional Stroop task showed different results: Ashley and Swick (2009) found that
younger adults showed lower levels of inhibition of negative information than neutral
information, but older adults did not show differences in inhibition between negative and
neutral information. In contrast, Wurm et al. (2004) found that older adults showed lower
levels of inhibition across valence, but they did not predict or find an interaction effect of
age by valence or a valence effect (Wurm et al., 2004). Specifically, older adults showed
lower levels of inhibition across the board (neutral, positive, and negative). In conclusion,
the evidence for inhibition of valence-specific information across adulthood is mixed.
It is difficult to generalize findings from these studies, so their conclusions cannot
be directly applied to this current study. The past studies are subject to confounds
inherent in task designs, and the findings could be task-dependent. For example,
Goeleven et al. (2010) introduced neutral stimuli (faces) as distractors in the control
condition but not in the priming condition, creating a confound between the two
conditions. In addition, neutral faces are sometimes ambiguous in valence and are often
perceived as negative rather than neutral. Thus, the presentation of neutral faces (paired
with negative faces) could slow down responses. Older adults, who have relatively
limited cognitive resources, are particularly susceptible to this additional requirement in
processing neutral faces. Their reaction time in the control condition increases, resulting
in a low inhibition score (which is the difference in reaction time between the priming
and control conditions). In addition, older and younger adults have been shown to use
different brain regions to process facial expressions (Gunning-Dixon et al., 2003). Thus,
it is difficult to rule out the possibility that age-related face processing increases the
response time for older adults rather than age-related decline in inhibition. Similarly,
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differing results in the two studies using the emotional Stroop task might stem from
variations in the experimental paradigm driven by the variable of interest in each study
(e.g., arousal level vs. valence): Wurm et al. (2004) were mainly interested in examining
individuals’ inhibition of materials with three types of arousal level (low vs. medium vs.
high), and thus equated the arousal level across neutral, positive, and negative words.
Therefore, even if there were a valence effect, it would be cancelled out by the equally
distributed arousal levels in each valence. In summary, the problems inherent in task
designs prevent us from drawing a definite conclusion in this matter.
However, these past studies still provide some valuable insight by presenting
relevant theories about the development of inhibition of valence-specific information
across adulthood. First, Wurm et al. (2004) proposed that declines in cognitive resources
in old age make older adults less successful in inhibiting or disengaging the interference
from more automatic and lower-level information (e.g., emotional information) than
younger adults. Building upon Wurm et al., Ashley and Swick (2009) proposed that the
valence of emotional information also needs to be considered because it can affect
information processing in different ages. Specifically, they considered the negativity bias
or effect in younger adults, which refers to younger adults’ preferential processing
(attention and memory) in negative information (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, &
Vohs, 2001). From their results, Ashley and Swick reasoned that the negativity effect
might exist because younger adults have a more difficult time disengaging negative
information relative to neutral information. On the other hand, older adults in their study
did not show differences between the inhibition of negative and neutral information,
suggesting a relatively well-preserved inhibition of negative information in late
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adulthood. However, Ashley and Swick did not include positive materials in their study,
so whether inhibition of positive information is also well preserved in old age needs
further investigation.
To help fill this gap of knowledge in the development of inhibition of valencespecific information, the well-known phenomenon of the positivity effect might disclose
some hints. The positivity effect refers to the phenomenon that older adults preferentially
process positive over negative information (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Mather &
Carstensen, 2003; Mather & Knight, 2005). Whether the positivity effect is primarily
driven by the decreased processing of negative information or the increased processing of
positive information is still contested (Grühn, Smith, & Baltes, 2005). Regardless, either
way leads to the same conclusion: an increased ratio of positivity over negativity with
advancing age (Charles et al., 2003; Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010). One possibility is that
as people age, they become better at inhibiting negative information and worse at
inhibiting positive information. Thus, I predict that A) inhibition of negative information
will increase with age, and B) inhibition of positive information will decrease with age
(Hypothesis 2.2a).
WM and aging. WM has been found to decline with age across measures in
cross-sectional studies (Borella, Carretti, & De Beni, 2008; Borella, Ghisletta, &
Ribaupierre, 2011; Hale et al., 2011; Linden, Brédart, & Beerten, 1994). Decreased WM
capacity in old age has been suggested to be the result of age-related declines in
processing (Salthouse & Babcock, 1991; Salthouse & Meinz, 1995), limited attention
resources (Craik, 1982), reduced coordination capacity (coordination between storage
and processing) (Mayr & Kliegl, 1993), and decline in the capacity of central executives
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(Linden et al., 1994). These declines explain why the size of the decrease in short-term
memory is smaller than the decline in WM. Short-term memory relies only on storage,
whereas WM involves both storage and processing and the coordination of both. This
higher demand involves processing, attention, and coordination of resources that shortterm memory does not require. Examples of short-term memory tasks used in previous
studies are forward digit span and letter span; examples of WM tasks are reading span
and computation span.
The backward word span task is selected in this study to examine individuals’ WM,
and the following focuses on age-related findings. Backward span tasks include two
versions: the backward digit span task and the backward word span task. Consistently
throughout the literature, performance in the backward span tasks has been shown to
decline with age. A meta-analysis on aging and verbal memory tasks (including both
short-term memory and WM tasks) shows that performance in the backward digit span
task declines with age (Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005). In addition, age differences in the
backward digit span task are found to be larger than those in the forward digit span task,
but smaller than those in other WM span tasks (e.g., reading span). Similarly, Bryan and
Luszcz (1996) examined younger and older adults’ WM using the backward word span
task, and also found declines in WM in old age. Taken together, based on the literature
summarized above, I predict WM for neutral information will decline with age
(Hypothesis 2.2b).
WM for valence-specific information and aging. As shown, WM declines with
age; on the other hand, older adults are known to process emotional information
differently from younger adults, raising the question about the development of WM for
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emotional information (also known as WM for valence-specific information or affective
WM) across adulthood. However, there is only one published study that specifically
tested WM for valence-specific information across age groups. Mikels et al. (2005)
examined younger and older adults’ WM for valence-specific information, which refers
to the ability to maintain initial emotional intensity and to compare this initial emotional
intensity with another emotional intensity evoked by a later stimulus (e.g., emotioneliciting pictures). They did not find an age-related decrease in WM for valence-specific
information; instead, they found that older adults showed better WM for positive
information relative to negative information, whereas younger adults showed the opposite
pattern—better WM for negative information relative to positive information. In addition,
for positive information, older adults actually showed better WM than younger adults.
Their findings demonstrated that WM for emotional information is well preserved in old
age, lending support for the positivity effect in old age.
However, the paradigm used in Mikels et al. (2005)—a modified delayed response
task—appears to be a “simple span task.” Simple span tasks (e.g., digit span) rely mostly
on maintenance or storage and minimally on processing, in contrast to complex span
tasks (e.g., reading span or operation span), which demand both storage and processing to
a similar extent (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). In this modified delayed
response task, individuals need to store the emotional intensity of the first image over a
brief period (3 seconds) until the second image appears and then must quickly compare
the emotional intensity. The processing demand appears to be minimal, and thus only
qualifies this task as a simple span task. Simple span tasks have been documented to
decline with age at a slower rate, and the size of the decline is smaller relative to complex
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span tasks. This may explain why the positivity effects of WM were found in this specific
paradigm.
The majority of WM measures that allow for testing valence-specific information,
including the backward word span task in my study, use a pure block design. It means
that each valence of materials is tested separately rather than together. This aspect of WM
tasks is different from that of many other attention or memory tasks in which the
positivity effect was found (c.f. Charles et al., 2003; Mather & Carstensen, 2003). For
example, Charles et al. (2003) presented a series of emotional images in random order
and asked participants to recall emotional images 15 minutes after the presentation. In
this case, images with different valences compete for attention and memory capacity, and
thus the positivity effect emerges. In contrast, most of the WM measures do not involve
more than one valence at a time. For example, consider the backward word span task: In
the positive version, participants recite positive words in a reverse order; in a negative
version, participants recite negative words in a reverse order. Words of different valence
never mix in the same trial. In this case, there is no context for the positivity effect to
occur. Therefore, I do not think the positivity effect applies in the context of WM while
WM is tested by the backward word span task.
Taken together, considering the overwhelming evidence showing the age-related
decline in WM and the pure block design of WM measures, I predict that WM for
positive information and WM for negative information decrease with age in the same
way as WM for neutral information (Hypothesis 2.2b).
Intersection between emotional aging and cognitive aging. My reviews of
emotional and cognitive aging show that although emotion and cognition take
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unparalleled developmental paths, they continue to interact throughout adulthood. Their
interaction has been studied most extensively in late adulthood and is known as the
positivity effect. The positivity effect shown in attention and memory has been suggested
to be a part of the emotion regulation processes for older adults (Carstensen, Mikels, &
Mather, 2006; Kryla-Lighthall & Mather, 2009; Shiota & Levenson, 2009). However, a
recent review by Isaacowitz and Blanchard-Fields (2012) did not find direct evidence that
the positivity effect in itself is emotion regulation. In other words, having a certain
attention or memory pattern does not make the person feel happier. They emphasized the
importance of conceptualizing the positivity effect as one of the processes that relate to
emotion regulation, and they suggested the need for additional study to investigate the
relationships between the positivity effect (in cognitive processes) and emotion
regulation.
Therefore, I take this research further by asking how age-related changes in
cognitive processes (valence-specific EF) relate to the ability to use positive reappraisal
(PRA) at different stages of adulthood. In other words, is it possible that the age-related
change in inhibition of negative information supports PRA to a greater or lesser extent for
older adults than for younger adults? Similarly, is it possible that the age-related change
in WM for positive information supports PRA to a greater or lesser extent for older adults
than for younger adults? Therefore, in the next step, I investigate the relationships
between valence-specific EF and PRA, using age as a moderator. This question could
potentially provide an opportunity to explore how younger and older adults might employ
positive reappraisal, based on the age-related differences in their cognitive processes.
This is an important question that has not yet been empirically investigated.
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Valence-specific EF and PRA by age. As reviewed earlier, older adults are
motivated to preserve emotional well-being. To achieve their emotional goals, positive
reappraisal is a useful and conceivable strategy. The processes in positive reappraisal
involve high-level cognitive control abilities (inhibition of negative information and WM
for positive information). Due to potential cognitive changes as a result of age, older
adults might use different cognitive functions to a different extent to support PRA. In
other words, the way PRA relies on inhibition and WM might vary to different degrees
across age, depending on how well inhibition and WM are preserved in aging. Based on
my review on inhibition and aging, if inhibition of negative information does not decline
or even increases with age, its contribution to PRA should increase with age. In contrast,
if WM for positive information decreases with age, it will not be sufficient to support
PRA, and thus the relationships between WM for positive information and PRA should
decrease with age.
In summary, I predict that the relationships between PRA and inhibition of negative
information increase with age (Hypothesis 2.3), and the relationships between PRA and
WM for positive information decrease with age (Hypothesis 2.4).
Limitations of previous studies. As illustrated here, a large body of research has
investigated emotional or cognitive aging, but less attention has been devoted to the
intersection of emotion regulation and cognitive processes over the course of adulthood.
This limits our understanding of the relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA
across the adult life span. In addition, as mentioned in the first part of this study, the other
limitation is a paucity of research on valence-specific EF, and thus there is even less
information about age-related changes in valence-specific EF. The existing studies about
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the development of valence-specific EF have only yielded mixed results, and thus require
replication. To address these limitations, I use the same sample in the first part of the
study, which is a community sample with a wide age range of 18 to 72 years to examine
the relationships between each key variable (PRA and valence-specific EF) and age; I
also examine the relationships between PRA and valence-specific EF as a function of
age.
Hypotheses II. Four main hypotheses were proposed in the second part of the
study.
2.1. PRA will increase with age.
2.2. The relationships between valence-specific EF and age include:
a. Inhibition of neutral information will stay constant across age; inhibition of
positive information will decrease with age; inhibition of negative information will
increase with age.
b. WM for neutral, positive, and negative information will decline with age.
2.3. The relationships between inhibition of negative information and PRA will
change as a function of age in the following ways:
a. Because the inhibition of negative information is not expected to decline or
even increase with age, its contribution to PRA is expected to increase with age.
b. Inhibition of neutral information and inhibition of positive information are not
expected to correlate with PRA at the first place, so the relationships between them and
PRA will remain non-significant.
2.4. The relationships between WM for positive information and PRA will change
as a function of age in the following ways:
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a. Because WM for positive information is expected to decrease with age, its
contribution to PRA is expected to decrease with age.
b. WM for neutral and negative information are not expected to correlate with
PRA at the first place, so the relationships between them and PRA will remain nonsignificant.
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Chapter Two: Method
Overview
This research was a part of a larger project (Denver Emotional Adjustment and
Responses to Stress, DEARS), which aimed to study a group of stressed individuals who
had experienced one stressful life event within the eight weeks of the study. For the
purpose of this dissertation, I only present information that is related to the current study.
This study included two phases: First, participants filled out online questionnaires
regarding demographic information. Second, participants came into a lab session, which
took place within two weeks after they filled out the questionnaires.
Participants
Participants were recruited through advertisement on online bulletins (Craigslist),
or postings in public areas (laundromats, libraries, and local hospitals). Three hundred
and thirty nine individuals responded to recruitment materials and were phoneinterviewed by a trained research assistant to establish that they were fluent in English,
and were older than 18 years. If they met these criteria and agreed to participate, they
were asked to fill out an online questionnaire regarding demographic information and
were invited to a lab session within two weeks of the phone interview. Participants were
compensated $35 dollars at the end of the lab session. Eighty-nine respondents were
excluded (See Table 1). As a result, 250 eligible individuals (135 female) between the
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ages of 18 and 72 years (M = 40.81, SD = 12.37) from the Denver Metro Area were
included in the final sample. Sample characteristics are summarized in Table 2.
Procedure
Within two weeks of the phone interview, participants were invited to the lab
session, which took place at the emotional regulation lab at the University of Denver.
Upon arrival, each participant was greeted by a research assistant and escorted to a quiet
and cozy experimental room with neutral lighting. The lab session began with a consent
procedure. During this time, the research assistant carefully explained the purpose of the
research, experimental procedures and compensation, and answered any related questions
that the participant might have. After authorizing his or her consent, the participant was
left alone in the experimental room to complete an online questionnaire, which measured
depressive symptoms and the perceived impact stress level, while the research assistant
stayed in an adjacent room. These two rooms were connected via intercom. This
questionnaire part of the study took about 20 to 30 minutes. After that, the research
assistant returned to administer several cognitive tasks, including a vocabulary test, and
measures of inhibition and WM (see Measures section below).
Next, the positive reappraisal task was administered via a computer. Participants
were asked to carefully watch a series of film clips and to provide emotion ratings after
each film clip (see Figure 2). Short film clips have been used to elicit sadness emotion
successfully (Troy et al., 2010) and have shown to be more ecologically valid than
emotional stimuli presented in words or pictures (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). To
begin with, a three-minute neutral film depicting a natural scene was presented. The
purpose of the neutral film was to induce a neutral mood across participants. After the
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neutral film, three short sad films were presented in a row to elicit a moderate level of
sadness. Each short clip was about two-minutes long and from these movies: Fatal
attraction, Kramer vs. Kramer, and I am Sam. Participants were asked to rate their
positive and negative emotions on a nine-point Likert scale after each film clip, with one
indicating “not at all” and nine indicating “extremely”. For two of the three sad films,
participants were simply asked to “watch the film carefully”; for the remaining film,
participants were asked to follow the positive reappraisal instruction to reappraise in a
positive light. The full reappraisal instruction is presented in the appendix C.
To avoid potential confounding factors such as habituation to sad films or the
regression to the mean, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two
experimental groups (Troy et al., 2010). Each group watched these films in the same
order, but with the reappraisal instruction shown in a different sad film clip. Participants
in Group 1 were instructed to use reappraisal during the second sad film; participants in
Group 2 were instructed to use reappraisal during the third sad film (see Figure 2). For
emotion ratings, participants rated 17 different kinds of emotions, including both negative
emotions (e.g., sadness, anger, and fear) and positive emotions (e.g., happiness, love, and
optimism). Each participant was debriefed at the end of the session and compensated $35
dollars for their lab participation.
Measures
Mental health. Individuals’ mental health was assessed with the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1984). The BDI consists of 21 multiple-choice items
about depressive symptoms experienced during the past week. Each item provides four
statements describing the depressive symptom, ranging in severity. In each item,
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participants are asked to choose the statement that best describes how they have felt in
the past week. One question about suicidal ideation was taken out, leaving 20 items in
total. Each item is scored on a 0 to 3 scale and the BDI score is summed across 20 items.
The BDI has been shown to have good internal consistency among the young adult
population (Storch, Roberti, & Roth, 2004) and the community dwelling old adult
population (Segal, Coolidge, Cahill, & O'Riley, 2008). The internal consistency of the
BDI in my sample was .94. The BDI has also been used widely across studies to measure
the current mental health state (Warr, 1990). Higher BDI scores (higher levels of
depressive symptoms) indicate lower levels of mental health. The average BDI score in
my sample was 10.26 (SD = 9.49, Range: 0 - 42).
Cognitive functioning. Individuals’ cognitive functioning was indexed by the
verbal ability measured with the vocabulary subtest of the Shipley Institute of Living
Scale (Zachary & Shipley, 1986). This vocabulary subtest consists of 40 multiple-choice
questions, in which participants are asked to choose the synonym of a target word from a
set of four words. The vocabulary score is computed as the total numbers of correct
responses out of forty. Administration time for this vocabulary subtest is about 10
minutes. The vocabulary subtest was originally designed as a brief screening tool for
measuring individuals’ general intelligence (verbal ability in particular). Thus, in my
study, I use the vocabulary score to represent individuals’ cognitive functioning. Higher
scores indicate higher levels of cognitive functioning. The average verbal ability in my
sample was 33.10 (SD = 3.64, Range: 0 - 40).
Perceived stress impact level. The perceived stress impact level was measured
with the Life Experiences Survey (LES; Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978). The LES
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consists of 46 items about a wide range of life stressors, including both negative (e.g.,
divorce) and positive events (e.g., getting a new job). Each item asks A) if the person has
experienced a particular stressor within the past 6 months (Yes or No), and B) the degree
to which the stressor has an impact on the person (ranging from - 3 as extremely negative
to 0 as no impact and + 3 as extremely positive). Because the majority of my sample
experienced some stressors before the recruitment, the scores of the perceived negative
impact of events during the past six months were used in the study. The perceived stress
impact level was calculated as the summation of impact scores from negative events and
was reverse-coded. Higher scores reflect higher perceived stress impact levels. The
average perceived stress impact level in my sample was 7.06 (SD = 7.03, Range: 0 - 34).
Sadness ratings. Sadness ratings after each film clip were collected to serve two
purposes. This was to verify the sadness induction in the emotion-eliciting paradigm
(manipulation check). Second, sadness ratings were used as one of the exclusion criteria.
Participants who reported zero level of sadness after watching the baseline sad film were
not included in my final sample (see Table 1).
Previous experience with films. Because the sad films used in the study were
clips from movies, there was a concern that participants’ previous experience with the
movie might influence the way they perceived the film and thus affected their ratings of
positive emotions. For example, participants who had seen the movie might rate their
positive emotions higher than participants who had not, because they have already
processed the information and shielded themselves from the negative impact. Thus, it was
important to collect information about participants’ previous experience with each film in
order to rule out this possibility.
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Positive reappraisal ability (PRA). Positive reappraisal ability (PRA) was
operationalized as the ability to increase positive emotions in a negative context after
receiving instructions to reappraise in a positive way; PRA was computed as the
standardized score of positive emotion ratings in the reappraisal films. I chose to use the
standardized score rather than the raw score because half of the participants received
reappraisal instructions in the second sad film, and the other half of the participants did so
in the third sad film (see Figure 2). Standardized scores allow PRA to be comparable
across the two groups.
Emotion ratings on six positive emotions (amusement, happiness, interest, love,
optimism, and pride) were collected, but only three of them were the targeted positive
emotions in the reappraisal instruction: happiness, love, and optimism. Amusement,
interest, and pride served only as filler questions to prevent participants from guessing the
research purpose. Thus, three PRA scores were generated and included in analyses: PRAHappiness, PRA-Love, and PRA-Optimism. A higher PRA score means a higher level of
discrete positive emotion being generated in positive reappraisal, and thus it indicates
better PRA.
Emotion reactivity (ER). Emotion reactivity was referred to as the initial
unregulated emotional response to the emotion-eliciting films. Thus, the ER was
operationalized by emotion ratings on positive emotions after the first sad film (the
baseline sad film). In parallel with PRA scores, three standardized ER scores were
generated and included in my analyses: ER-Happiness, ER-Love, and ER-Optimism. The
higher ER score means a higher level of discrete positive emotion in response to the
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baseline sad film, and thus it indicates a greater reactivity of positive emotion before
engaging in reappraisal strategy.
Executive function (EF). Two subcomponents of EF were examined: inhibition
and WM. Each subcomponent was examined on neutral and affective materials to
separate valence-specific EF. Inhibition was measured with the negative priming task
(inhibition of neutral information) and the negative affective priming task (inhibition of
positive information and inhibition of negative information). WM was examined by the
backward word span task in both neutral (WM for neutral information) and affective
versions (WM for positive information and WM for negative information). Further
description of these tasks is as follows.
Inhibition. Inhibition of neutral information was measured with the negative
priming task (Neill, Valdes, & Terry, 1995). The negative priming task includes a series
of paired trials: a prime-trial and a test-trial. In each trial, two words (one distracter and
one target) are presented simultaneously on a computer screen. Participants are instructed
to ignore the distracter (in red) and pay attention to the target (in blue); meanwhile, they
have to identify whether the target word is “living or nonliving” by key pressing.
Participants are not aware of the separation of the prime- and test-trial (see Figure 3a).
Two conditions are included in the paradigm: the priming condition and the
control condition. In the priming condition, the distracter presented in the prime-trial
shares the same attribute (living or nonliving) with the target in the following test-trial. In
the control condition, the distracter in the prime-trial does not share the same attribute as
the target in the following test-trial. In the priming condition, when the inhibition of the
attribute of the distracter of the prime- trial is still active, responses to the target with the
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same attribute in the test-trial should be delayed. The delayed reaction time toward the
target word in the test-trial is referred to as the negative priming effect, which reflects
inhibition of neutral information. Because the main function of the prime-trial is to
manipulate the negative priming effect, only the reaction time toward the target in the
test-trial is used in the following analyses. The negative priming effect is calculated by
subtracting the reaction time toward the target in the control condition from the reaction
time toward the target in the priming condition. The higher value indicates a stronger
inhibition of neutral information (Inhibition-Neutral).
Similarly, inhibition of positive information and inhibition of negative information
were measured with the negative affective priming task (Joormann, 2004). This task also
includes a series of paired trials: a prime-trial and a test-trial. In each trial, two words
(one distracter and one target) are presented simultaneously on a computer screen.
Participants are instructed to ignore the distracter (in red) and pay attention to the target
(in blue); meanwhile, they have to evaluate whether the target word is “positive valence
or negative valence” by key pressing. Participants are not aware of the separation of the
prime- and test- trial (see Figure 3b).
Two conditions are included in the paradigm: the priming condition and the
control condition. In the priming condition, the distracter presented in the prime-trial
shares the same valence (positive or negative) with the target in the following test-trial. In
the control condition, the distracter in the prime-trial does not share the valence with the
target in the following test-trial. In the priming condition, when the inhibition of the
valence of the distracter of the prime-trial is still active, responses to the target with the
same valence should be delayed. The delayed reaction time toward the target is referred
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to as the negative affective priming effect (Joormann, 2004), which reflects inhibition of
affective information. Because the main function of the prime-trial is to manipulate the
negative affective priming effect, only the reaction time toward the target in the test-trial
is used in the following analyses. The negative affective priming effect is calculated by
subtracting the reaction time toward the target in the control condition from the reaction
time to the target in the priming condition. The higher value indicates stronger inhibition
of affective information. If the shared valence in the priming condition is positive, the
value represents inhibition of positive information (Inhibition-Positive); if the shared
valence in the priming condition is negative, the value represents inhibition of negative
information (Inhibition-Negative).
Working memory (WM). Working memory was measured with the backward
word-span task. This task is modified from the backward digit span task, a standard test
of short term memory (Baddeley, 1986), in which participants are instructed to repeat the
number they heard in a reverse order. The length of the list represents their memory span.
Similarly, in this backward word-span task, participants are asked to listen carefully to a
series of words and then report back in a reverse order. For example, if the test administer
says “fish-dog-cat”, the participant should reply “cat-dog-fish”. This task is a measure of
working memory because participants need to keep the words in mind and reorder them
backwards, which requires the storage, update, and manipulation of memory. Working
memory is operationalized as the greatest number of words being correctly reported in
the reverse order on two successive trials. A higher score indicates a higher capacity in
working memory.
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Because my research concerns valence-specific WM, each participant was tested
in three versions of the WM task (neutral words, positive words, and negative words). To
avoid the order effect, the research assistant administered these three versions in a
random order. Three WM scores based on the valence of words were generated: WM for
neutral information (WM-Neutral), WM for positive information (WM-Positive), and
WM for negative information (WM-Negative).
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Chapter Three: Results
Manipulation Check: Sadness Induction
First, to double check that the three sad films induced a moderate level of sadness
in this sample, I examined sadness ratings for unmanipulated (watch) sad films: the first
sad film for the entire sample (Group 1 and Group 2), the second sad film for Group 2,
and the third sad film for Group 1. Mean sadness ratings were 6.37 (SD = 2.19) for the
first sad film, 6.07 (SD = 2.35) for the second sad film, and 6.29 (SD = 2.21) for the third
sad film. All three sad films induced significantly greater levels of sadness than the
neutral film, MNeutral = 1.27, SD = .98; all ps < .01 (A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of
.0167 was applied to control for the possibility of a Type I error).
Second, I examined whether the unmanipulated sadness ratings were similar
across three sad films. Results showed that sadness ratings for the first sad film were not
significantly different from sadness ratings for the second sad film, t(113) = .980 , p =
.32, or the third sad film, t(124) = .601, p = .55; sadness ratings for the second sad film
were also not significantly different from sadness ratings for the third sad film, t(237) =
.707, p = .48 (A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied).
Third, I examined whether the three sad films induced a greater level of sadness
than other types of negative emotions (i.e., anger, anxiety, and fear). Results indicated
that each of the sad films induced greater sadness than anger, anxiety, and fear, all ps <
.01 (A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied).
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Summary. This manipulation check showed that the three sad films A) induced a
moderate level of sadness, B) induced similar levels of sadness, and C) induced a greater
level of sadness than other types of negative emotions.
Manipulation Check: Reappraisal Instruction
To examine whether the reappraisal instruction increased positive emotions, I first
conducted a repeated measure ANOVA with the discrete positive emotions reported in
two film types (baseline sad film vs. reappraisal film) as a within-subject variable and
group membership (Group 1 vs. Group 2) as a between-subject variable. A consistent
pattern emerged across two discrete positive emotions (happiness and optimism; see
Figure 4a and Figure 4b). For happiness, a significant main effect of film type (baseline
sad film vs. reappraisal film) was found, F(1, 247) = 352.62, p < .01, suggesting a higher
level of happiness was reported in the reappraisal films than the baseline film. Neither the
main effect for the group nor the interaction between film type and group were
significant, F (1, 247) = 1.79, p = .19, F (1, 247) = 2.06, p = .15, respectively. Similarly,
for optimism, a significant main effect of film type was found, F (1, 247) = 306.37, p <
.01, suggesting a higher level of optimism was reported in the reappraisal films than the
baseline sad film. Neither the main effect for the group nor the interaction between film
type and group were significant, F (1, 247) = .00, p = .98, F (1, 247) = .34, p = .56,
respectively.
However, a slightly different pattern was revealed when I conducted a repeated
measure ANOVA with the emotion of love as the dependent variable (see Figure 4c). The
main effect for film type was significant, F(1, 247) = 281.50, p < .01, indicating a higher
level of love was reported in the reappraisal films than the baseline sad film. However,
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both the group main effect and the interaction between film type and group were
significant, F(1, 247) = 4.05, p = .05, F(1, 247) = 9.25, p <.01, respectively. During the
baseline sad film, the two groups did not differ in their ratings on the emotion of love
(MGroup 1 = 1.79, MGroup 2 = 1.73), t(248) = .316, p = .75, but during the reappraisal films,
Group 2 reported a higher level of love than Group 1 (MGroup 1 = 4.13, MGroup 2 = 5.10),
t(247) = - 2.80, p < . 01. Although the results for the emotion of love were unexpected,
participants overall reported a higher level of positive emotions in the reappraisal films
than the baseline film, suggesting that they engaged in the positive reappraisal strategy to
up-regulate positive emotions.
Summary. This manipulation check about reappraisal instruction confirmed that
higher levels of positive emotions (happiness, love, and optimism) were reported in the
reappraisal films than the baseline sad film.
Previous Experience with Films
Because the emotion eliciting stimuli came from movie clips, some participants
might have already seen some of the clips. To ensure that participants’ previous
experience with films did not affect their emotion ratings, several independent t-tests
were conducted (A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied).
For both the baseline sad film and the reappraisal films, I used discrete positive
emotion (happiness, love, and optimism) as the dependent variable and experience with
the sad film as the grouping variable (0 = haven’t seen it before, 1 = have seen it before).
No group differences for the baseline sad film were found in each positive emotion
(happiness, love, and optimism), t(237) = -.91, p = .36, t(237) = -.56, p = .57, and t(237)
= .12, p = .91, respectively. Similarly, no group differences for the reappraisal films were
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found in each positive emotion (happiness, love, and optimism), t(237) = -.47, p = .64,
t(237) = -.24, p = .02. t(237) = -.47, p = .64, respectively.
Summary. This analysis about previous experience with films confirmed that
previous experience with the sad films did not influence participants’ ratings on positive
emotions.
Older Adult Sample Characteristics
To ensure that my older adult sample was not subject to dementia, I compared
several key characteristics—mental health, cognitive functioning, and the perceived
stress impact level—between the younger (age 18-36) and the older adult sample (age 5672).
Mental health. Mental health was indicated by levels of depressive symptoms
(indexed by the BDI score). To examine the mental health status between the younger
and older adult samples, one independent groups t-test was conducted: The BDI score
was entered as the dependent variable and the age group was entered as the grouping
variable (0 = younger adults, 1= older adults). Results showed that younger (M = 8.84,
SD = 9.38) and older adults (M = 10.81, SD = 9.89) do not differ in the severity of
depressive symptoms, t(135) = -1.068, p = .29. In other words, my older adult sample
showed an equivalent level of mental health as compared to my younger adult sample.
Cognitive functioning. Cognitive functioning was represented by the verbal
ability (indexed by the Shipley vocabulary score). To examine the cognitive functioning
between the younger and older adult samples, one independent groups t-test was
conducted: The Shipley vocabulary score was entered as the dependent variable and the
age group was entered as the grouping variable (0 = younger adults, 1 = older adults).
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Results showed that older adults (M = 35, SD = 3.37) have higher verbal ability than
younger adults (M = 32, SD = 3.76), t(135) = -4.00, p = .000. In other words, my older
adult sample showed equivalent or even higher levels of cognitive functioning than my
younger adult sample.
The perceived stress impact level. The perceived stress impact level was
measured with the Life Experiences Survey (LES; Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978). To
examine the perceived stress impact level between the younger and older adult samples,
one independent groups t-test was conducted: The sum score of the perceived stress
impact level during the past six month was entered as the dependent variable and the age
group was entered as the grouping variable (0 = younger adults, 1= older adults). Results
showed that younger (M = 7.19, SD = 6.76) and older adults (M = 5.41, SD = 5.68) do not
differ in the perceived stress impact level during the past six months, t(135) = -1.068, p =
.29. In other words, my older adult sample showed an equivalent level of perceived stress
impact level as my younger adult sample.
Summary. My older adult sample showed levels of mental health, cognitive
functioning, and the perceived stress impact level during the past six months that were
comparable to those of the younger adult sample. Therefore, the possibility that my older
adult sample has dementia can be ruled out.
Descriptives
Positive reappraisal ability. Positive reappraisal ability (PRA) was defined as
the ability to increase positive emotions while receiving the instruction to reappraise in a
positive way; thus, PRA was operationalized as ratings of positive emotions during the
reappraisal films. I investigated three positive emotions and computed three PRA
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measures: PRA-Happiness, PRA-Love, and PRA-Optimism. There are three reasons that
I examined discrete PRA rather than forming a composite PRA score. First, each of these
positive emotions carries a unique aspect of positive emotions beyond the shared variance
in the positive core affect. Examining discrete PRA allows opportunities to explore the
unique nature of each positive emotion that is generated based on positive reappraisal,
and to examine if any PRA might rely more on valence-specific EF than the other(s).
Second, examining discrete PRA rather than the PRA composite avoids a possible error
that the significant results of one PRA go undetected because three types of PRA are
collapsed. Third, the inter-item reliability for the PRA composite score is too low to
suggest this is one coherent construct (Cronbach’s α = 0.6). Because not all participants
reappraised the same film, to make PRA comparable across films, I z-scored PRA.
Emotion reactivity. Emotion reactivity (ER) was defined as the initial emotion
response toward an emotion-eliciting event; thus, ER was operationalized as the ratings
of positive emotions at the baseline sad film (which is the unregulated sad film). Similar
to the PRA measures, I investigated three discrete positive emotions and calculated each
reactivity score: ER-Happiness, ER-Love, and ER-Optimism. Each reactivity score was
also z-scored so that they were on the same scale as PRA.
Table 3 shows the mean, standard deviation, and the inter-correlation between ER
and PRA for the entire sample and by age group.
Executive function (EF). I measured two subcomponents of EF: inhibition and
WM, each of which was measured with valence-specific materials (neutral, positive, and
negative). This resulted in six EF scores. For inhibition, three measures were computed:
inhibition of neutral information (Inhibition-Neutral), inhibition of positive information
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(Inhibition-Positive), and inhibition of negative information (Inhibition-Negative). For
WM, three measures were computed: WM for neutral information (WM-neutral), WM
for positive information (WM-positive), WM for negative information (WM-negative).
Table 4 shows the mean, standard deviation, and inter-correlation among these EF
variables for the entire sample and by age group.
Question 1: Does Valence-specific EF Correlate with PRA?
Inhibition and PRA. I predicted that Inhibition-Negative correlates with PRA,
but that Inhibition-Neutral and Inhibition-Positive do not. I conducted three hierarchical
multiple regression analyses to test this hypothesis and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level
of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent variable; emotion
reactivity (ER) of the same emotion as PRA was entered as the predictor variable in the
first step and inhibition of valence-specific information was entered as the predictor in
the second step. Inhibition-Neutral, Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative were
examined in three separate regression models.
Contrary to my prediction, Inhibition-Negative was not correlated with three
types of PRA, all ps >.05 (see Table 5.3). As predicted, no association between
Inhibition-Neutral and PRA was found, all ps >.05 (see Table 5.1); no association
between Inhibition-Positive and PRA was found, all ps > .05 (see Table 5.2).
WM and PRA. I predicted that WM-Positive positively correlates with PRA, but
WM-Neutral and WM-Negative do not. I conducted three hierarchical multiple
regression analyses to test this hypothesis and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167
was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent variable; ER for the same emotion
of PRA was entered as the predictor in the first step and the valence-specific WM was
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entered as the predictor in the second step. WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WMNegative were examined in three separate regression models.
Contrary to my prediction, WM-Positive was not associated with three types of
PRA, all ps >.05 (see Table 6.2). As predicted, no association between WM-Neutral and
PRA was found, all ps >.05 (see Table 6.1); no association between WM-Negative and
PRA was found either, all ps > .05 (see Table 6.3).
Secondary analyses 1– nonlinear relationships. The main analyses indicated no
linear relationship between valence-specific EF and PRA; however, it is possible that the
relationships are not linear. Thus, I conducted secondary analyses to explore the
possibility of curvilinear relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA.
Specifically, I examined the quadratic relationships between valence-specific EF and
PRA because it is possible that as valence-specific EF increases to a level that supports
the highest level of PRA, the increase in PRA may level off.
Inhibition and PRA. To examine the quadratic relationships between PRA and
inhibition, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression analyses and a Bonferroni
adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent
variable. ER of the same emotion as PRA was entered as the predictor in the first step;
inhibition of valence-specific information was entered as the predictor in the second step;
inhibition squared was entered as the predictor in the third step. Inhibition-Neutral,
Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative were examined in three separate regression
models. Results showed no association between inhibition of valence-specific
information and PRA all ps > .05 (see Table 7.1-7.3).
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WM and PRA. To examine the quadratic relationships between PRA and WM, I
conducted three hierarchical multiple regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha
level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent variable. ER of the
same emotion as PRA was entered as the predictor variable in the first step; WM for
valence-specific information was entered as the predictor in the second step; WM squared
was entered as the predictor in the third step. WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WMNegative were examined in three separate regression models. Results showed no
association between WM for valence-specific information and PRA all ps > .05 (see
Table 8.1-8.3).
Secondary analyses 2– extreme groups approach. The analyses so far have
shown that no linear or curvilinear relationship exists between valence-specific EF and
PRA. The next analytic strategy was to sample extreme values of valence-specific EF.
This methodology is called extreme groups approach (EGA). This is not a redundant step
after curvilinear regression analyses because EGA captures extreme scores whereas
curvilinear regression analysis concerns the shape of the relationships of two variables.
EGA has been widely used in studies that investigate EF in college students to ensure that
the lower end of the EF distribution was not under represented (e.g., Schmeichel et al.,
2008) and to enhance statistical power (Kelly, 1939). In the current study, ninety-three
percent of the participants had an education level equal to or higher than the associate
degree or partial college. It is possible that the lower extreme values of the EF were under
represented in the sample. In other words, sampling from the extremes ensures that the
key variables in my hypothesis were adequately sampled, as suggested by Schmeichel et
al. (2008). However, I have to note that the use of EGA could inflate the magnitude of a
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relationship (Preacher, Rucker, MacCullum, & Nicewander, 2005) and the results need to
be interpreted with caution.
Inhibition and PRA. To examine the relationships between PRA and inhibition of
valence-specific information by EGA, I conducted three independent groups t tests and a
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Three types of standardized PRA
residuals (controlling for the variance from the corresponding emotion reactivity) were
entered as test variables and two extreme groups (high vs. low; individuals who scored
higher than 1 SD above the mean on inhibition scores belong to the high extreme group,
and individuals who scored lower than 1 SD below the mean on inhibition scores belong
to the low extreme group) were entered as the grouping variable. Inhibition-Neutral,
Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative were examined in three separate sets of t
tests.
Results showed that individuals with the extreme inhibition scores do not differ
on PRA. For Inhibition-Negative, group differences on PRA-Happiness, PRA-Love, and
PRA-Optimism were not significant, all ps > .05; similarly for Inhibition-Positive and
Inhibition-Neutral, group differences on PRA were not significant, all ps > .05. Overall,
the results in EGA revealed the same non-significant relationship as in regression
analyses such that inhibition of valence-specific information did not correlate with PRA.
WM and PRA. To examine the relationships between PRA and WM for valencespecific information by EGA, I conducted three independent groups t tests and a
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Three types of standardized PRA
residuals (controlling for the variance from the corresponding ER) were entered as test
variables and two extreme groups (high vs. low; individuals who scored higher than 1 SD
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above the mean on WM scores belong to the high extreme group, and individuals who
scored lower than 1 SD below the mean on WM scores belong to the low extreme group)
were entered as the grouping variable. WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WM-Negative
were examined in three separate sets of t tests.
Results showed that individuals with the extreme WM scores do not differ on
PRA. For WM-Positive, group differences on PRA-Happiness, PRA-Love, and PRAOptimism were not significant, all ps > .05; similarly for WM-Neutral and WMNegative, group differences on PRA were not significant, all ps > .05. Overall, the results
in EGA revealed the same non-significant relationship as in regression analyses, such that
WM for valence-specific information did not correlate with PRA.
Summary. I examined Question one (the relationships between valence-specific
EF and PRA) by employing three statistical methods (linear regression analysis,
curvilinear regression analysis, and extreme groups analysis). Three methods have
yielded similar results. Contrary to my prediction, PRA was not associated with
Inhibition-Negative or WM-Positive, either in a linear or quadratic way.
Question 2.1: Does PRA Increase with Age?
To investigate the developmental trajectory of PRA across adulthood, I
conducted three hierarchical multiple regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha
level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent variable; ER of the
same emotion of PRA was entered as the predictor in the first step and age was entered as
the predictor in the second step. PRA-Happiness, PRA-Love, and PRA-Optimism were
examined in three separate regression models.
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Results indicated that the age effect on PRA-Love was significant, B = .012, p =
.01. In contrast, the effects of age on PRA-Happiness and on PRA-Optimism were both
not significant, B = -.002, p = .71 and B = .001, p = .90. In summary, the reappraisal
ability to increase the emotion of love increased with age, but not the reappraisal ability
to increase the emotions of happiness and optimism.
Secondary analyses—nonlinear relationships. The main analyses indicated
PRA-Love was positively associated with age, but no association between age and PRAHappiness or PRA-Optimism was found; however, it is possible that these relationships
are not linear. Thus, I conducted secondary analyses to explore the possibility of
curvilinear relationships between PRA and age. Specifically, I examined the quadratic
relationships between PRA and age because Carstensen et al. (2000) suggested that there
is a trending quadratic relationship between age and emotion regulation.
To investigate the quadratic relationships between age and PRA, I conducted
three hierarchical multiple regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of
.0167 was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent variable. ER of the same
emotion of PRA was entered as the predictor in the first step, age (centered) was entered
as the predictor in the second step, and age squared was entered as the predictor in the
third step. PRA-Happiness, PRA-Love, and PRA-Optimism were examined in three
separate regression models.
Results indicated that for PRA-Happiness, the effects of age and age squared were
both not significant, B = -.002, p = .66, and B = .000, p = .96. For PRA-Love, the effect
of age was significant, B = .012, p = .01, but the effect of age squared was not significant,
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B = .002, p = .68. For PRA-Optimism, the effects of age and age squared were both not
significant, B = .000, p = .93 and B = .000, p = .90.
Summary. PRA-Love was positively associated with age in a linear way, but not
in a quadratic way. PRA-Happiness and PRA-Optimism were not associated with age,
either in a linear or a quadratic way.
Question 2.2: Does Valence-specific EF Change with Age?
To examine the developmental trajectory of valence-specific EF, I conducted a
series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses using age as the predictor for valencespecific EF.
Inhibition and age. To examine the relationships between inhibition of valencespecific information and age, inhibition of valence-specific information was entered as
the dependent variable and age was entered as the predictor. Inhibition-Neutral,
Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative were examined in three separate regression
models. A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied.
Consistent with my prediction, age was not associated with Inhibition-Neutral, B
= -1.438, p = .52. However, contrary to my prediction, age was not associated with
Inhibition-Positive or Inhibition-Negative, B = .833, p = .74 and B = 3.798, p = .11. In
summary, Inhibition-Neutral, Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative remained
constant across adulthood.
WM and age. To examine the relationships between WM for valence-specific
information and age, WM for valence-specific information was entered as the dependent
variable and age was entered as the predictor. WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WM-
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Negative were examined in three separate regression models. A Bonferroni adjusted
alpha level of .0167 was applied
Contrary to my prediction, age was not associated with WM-Neutral, WMPositive, or WM-Negative, B = -.207, p = .022, B = -.134, p = .205, and B = -.023, p =
.792. In summary, WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WM-Negative remained constant
across adulthood.
Secondary analyses—nonlinear relationships. The main analyses indicated no
linear relationships between valence-specific EF and age. It is possible that the
relationships are not linear. Thus, I conducted secondary analysis to explore curvilinear
relationships between valence-specific EF and age. Specifically, I examined the quadratic
relationships between valence-specific EF and age because the PFC has been documented
to fully mature close to the age of 30, and thus EF—the PFC-based cognitive function—
could increase in early adulthood and then level off later sometime after the midadulthood.
Inhibition and age. To examine the quadratic relationships between inhibition of
valence-specific information and age, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression
analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Inhibition of
valence-specific information was entered as the dependent variable; age (z-score) was
entered as the predictor in the first step and age squared was entered as the predictor in
the second step. Inhibition-Neutral, Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative were
examined in three separate regression models.
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Results showed that age and age squared both were not associated InhibitionNeutral, B = -1.438, p = .517, B = 5.458, p = .049, Inhibition-Positive, B = .833, p = .742,
B = .457, p = .860, or Inhibition-Negative, B = 3.798, p = .109, B = -1.871, p = .441.
WM and age. To examine the quadratic relationships between WM for valencespecific information and age, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression analyses
and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. WM for valence-specific
information was entered as the dependent variable; age (z-score) was entered as the
predictor in the first step and age squared was entered as the predictor in the second step.
WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WM-Negative were examined in three separate
regression models.
Results showed that age and age squared were not associated with WM-Neutral
information, B = -.134, p = .205, B = -.232, p = .036, WM-Positive, B = -.207, p = .022, B
= -.120, p = .201, or WM-Negative, B = -.023, p = .792, B = -.137, p = .134.
Summary. Both inhibition of valence-specific information and WM for valencespecific information were not associated with age, either in a linear or quadratic way.
These findings suggest that valence-specific EF remains constant across adulthood.
Question 2.3: Do the Relationships between Inhibition of Valence-specific
Information and PRA Change across Adulthood?
In this section, results are presented in the order of Inhibition-Neutral, InhibitionPositive, and Inhibition-Negative.
Inhibition-Neutral. To examine whether the relationships between inhibitionNeutral and PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple
regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each
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PRA was entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was
entered as the predictor in the first step, age (z-score) and Inhibition-Neutral (z-score)
were entered as predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and
Inhibition-neutral was entered as the predictor in the third step. PRA-Happiness, PRALove, and PRA-Optimism were examined in three separate regression models.
Both the main effect of age and the main effect of Inhibition-Positive were not
significant, all ps > .02 and all ps > .14. The interaction effect of age and InhibitionNeutral was not significant for the three types of PRA, all ps > .161. In summary, the
relationships between Inhibition-Neutral and PRA remained constant (non-significant)
across adulthood (see Table 9.1).
Inhibition-Positive. To examine whether the relationships between InhibitionPositive and PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple
regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each
PRA was entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was
entered as the predictor in the first step, age (z-score) and the Inhibition-Positive (z-score)
were entered as predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and
Inhibition-Positive was entered as the predictor in the third step.
Both the main effect of age and the main effect of Inhibition-Positive were not
significant, all ps > .02 and all ps > .60. The interaction effect of age and InhibitionPositive was not significant for the three types of PRA, all ps > .30. In summary, the
relationships between Inhibition-Positive and PRA remained constant (non-significant)
across adulthood (see Table 9.2).
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Inhibition-Negative. To examine whether the relationships between InhibitionNegative and PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple
regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each
PRA was entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was
entered as the predictor in the first step, age (z-score) and the Inhibition-Negative (zscore) were entered as predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and
Inhibition-Negative was entered as the predictor in the third step.
The main effect of age was not significant, except for PRA-Love, B = .167, p =
.014. The main effect of Inhibition-Negative was not significant, all ps > .56. The
interaction effect of age and Inhibition-Negative was significant for the three types of
PRA, all Bs > .168, ps < .01. In other words, the relationships between InhibitionNegative and PRA vary as a function of age (see Table 9.3).
To further examine the interaction effect of age and Inhibition-Negative on PRA,
the relationships were plotted, following the procedure suggested by Aiken and West
(1991). The interaction is shown in Figure 5a, 5b and 5c. Simple slopes analyses were
performed to test that A) the slopes of the simple regression line for each age value (1 SD
below the age mean as the younger adult group, the age mean as the middle-aged adult
group, and 1 SD above the age mean as the older adult group) were significantly different
from zero, and B) the slope for the older adult group was different from the slope for the
younger adult group (Aiken & West, 1991).
For PRA-Happiness, simple slope analyses revealed that the effect of InhibitionNegative in older adults was marginally greater than zero, B = .166, t(244) = 1.856, p =
.064; the effect of Inhibition-Negative in middle age adults was not different from zero, B
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= -.002, t(244) = -.032, p = .97; the effect of Inhibition-Negative in younger adults was
marginally smaller than zero, B = -.170, t(244) = -1.901, p = .058. In addition, the slope
for older adults was different from the slope for younger adults, t(244) = 8.40, p < .001.
In summary, for older adults, a higher level of Inhibition-Negative was associated with a
higher level of PRA-Happiness; in contrast, for younger adults, a higher level of
Inhibition-Negative was associated with a lower level of PRA-Happiness (see Figure 5a).
For PRA-Love, simple slope analyses revealed that the effect of InhibitionNegative in older adults was greater than zero, B = .178, t(244) = 1.990, p = .05; the
effect of Inhibition-Negative in middle age adults was not different from zero, B = -.004,
t(244) = -.063, p = .95; the effect of Inhibition-Negative in younger adults was smaller
than zero, B = - .186, t(244) = - 2.079, p = .03. In addition, the slope for older adults was
different from the slope for younger adults, t(244) = 9.10, p < .001. In summary, for
older adults, a higher level of Inhibition-Negative was associated with a higher level of
PRA-Love; in contrast, for younger adults, a higher level of Inhibition-Negative was
associated with a lower level of PRA-Love (see Figure 5b).
Similarly, for PRA-Optimism, simple slope analyses revealed that the effect of
Inhibition-Negative in older adults was marginally greater than zero, B = .145, t(240) =
1.872, p = .06, the effect of Inhibition-Negative in middle age adults was not different
from zero, B = -.036, t(240) = -.057, p = .57, and the effect of Inhibition-Negative in
younger adults was smaller than zero, B = - .217, t(240) = - 2.079, p = .03. In addition,
the slope for older adults was different from the slope for younger adults, t(244) = 9.05, p
< .001. In summary, for older adults, a higher level of Inhibition-Negative was associated
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with a higher level of PRA-Optimism; in contrast, for younger adults, a higher level of
Inhibition-Negative was associated with a lower level of PRA-Optimism (see Figure 5c).
Summary. The relationships between Inhibition-Negative and PRA varied as a
function of age. For older adults, Inhibition-Negative was positively associated with
PRA; for younger adults, Inhibition-Negative was negatively associated with PRA.
Regarding Inhibition-Neutral and Inhibition-Positive, their relationships with PRA
remained non-significant across adulthood.
Question 2.4: Do the Relationships between WM for Valence-specific Information
and PRA Change across Adulthood?
In this section, results are presented in the order of WM-Neutral, WM-Positive,
and WM-Negative.
WM-Neutral. To examine whether the relationships between WM-Neutral and
PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression
analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was
entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was entered as a
predictor in the first step, age (z-score) and WM-Neutral (z-score) were entered as
predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and WM-Neutral was
entered as the predictor in the third step.
The main effect of age was not significant, except for PRA-Love, B = .164, p <
.01. The main effect of WM-Neutral was also not significant, all ps > .084. The
interaction effect of age and WM-Neutral was not significant for all three types of PRA,
all ps > .128. In summary, the relationships between WM-Neutral and PRA remained
constant (non-significant) across adulthood (see Table 10.1).
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WM-Positive. To examine whether the relationships between WM-Positive and
PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression
analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was
entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was entered as a
predictor in the first step, age (z-score) and WM-Positive (z-score) were entered as
predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and WM-Positive was
entered as a predictor in the third step.
The main effect of age was not significant, except for PRA-Love, B = .161, p =
.01. The main effect of WM-Positive was also not significant, all ps > .255. The
interaction effect of age and WM-Positive was not significant across all three types of
PRA, all ps > .343. In summary, the relationships between WM-Positive and PRA
remained constant (non-significant) across adulthood (see Table 10.2).
WM-Negative. To examine whether the relationships between WM-Negative and
PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression
analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was
entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was entered as a
predictor variable in the first step, age (z-score) and WM-Negative (z-score) were entered
as predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and WM-Negative was
entered as the predictor in the third step.
The main effect of age was not significant, except for PRA-Love, B = .174, p =
.006. The main effect of WM-Negative was not significant, all ps > .185. The interaction
effect of age and WM-Negative was not significant across all three types of PRA, all ps >
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.531. In summary, the relationships between WM-Negative and PRA remained constant
(non-significant) across adulthood (see Table 10.3).
Summary. The relationships between WM for valence-specific information and
PRA did not change across adulthood. In other words, they remained constant (nonsignificant) across adulthood.
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Chapter Four: Discussion
The overall goal of this study was to examine the role of two subcomponents of
EF in the ability to up-regulate positive emotions after reappraisal. The first part of this
research examined the relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA. I proposed
that based on a dual-process model, positive reappraisal involves inhibiting negative
information as well as maintaining, updating, and manipulating positive information.
Thus, I predicted that both inhibition of negative information and WM for positive
information are positively associated with PRA, but other types of valence-specific EF
are not. The second part of this research examined the relationships between valencespecific EF and PRA while considering age as a moderator. Previous studies have
documented decline in cognitive function but well-preserved emotional function in old
age. Thus, I predicted that the relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA change
over the course of adulthood. Specifically, the relationships between inhibition of
negative information and PRA increase with age, while the relationships between WM
for positive information and PRA decrease with age.
I. Valence-specific Executive Function and Positive Reappraisal Ability
Inhibition and PRA. Regarding how inhibition of valence-specific information
contributes to PRA, the results differed from what was predicted: Inhibition of negative
information is not associated with PRA, either in a linear or curvilinear relationship. I
discuss in the following what might have contributed to this non-significant association.
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Negative affective priming task. Concerning the measure of inhibition, it is
possible that the negative affective priming task inefficiently measures the multifaceted
nature of inhibition ability (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). This type of inhibition, identified
by the negative affective priming effect, is only one aspect of inhibition, and thus might
not fully capture or reflect the complex inhibitory mechanisms involved in positive
reappraisal. In addition, on a neuroanatomical level, the negative priming effect has been
suggested to operate mostly in the posterior cortex and the ventral or occipital-temporal
visual pathway (the “what” pathway), rather than the prefrontal cortex (Connelly &
Hasher, 1993). That is, the negative priming effect might not reflect the PFC-based
inhibition process, which is activated during reappraisal and is expected to support PRA
directly (Ochsner, 2002; Ochsner & Gross, 2008).
However, previous studies have shown that inhibition of negative information,
identified by the negative affective priming effect, plays an important role in emotion
regulation. The reduced negative affective priming effect for negative materials is related
to increased rumination in depressive patients (Joormann, 2004, 2006) and the decreased
use of reappraisal in daily life (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). Although no association
between inhibition of negative information (measured by the negative affective priming
task) and PRA was found, I do not completely rule out the possibility that inhibition of
negative information is engaged during positive reappraisal.
I argue that this specific type of inhibition, identified by the negative affective
priming effect, is necessary in the process of positive reappraisal. Given that A) this type
of inhibition reflects how successful individuals are able to suppress unwanted
information that is supposed to be ignored, and B) deficits in this type of inhibition result
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in prolonged processing of unwanted information in WM, a process that exacerbates
rumination on negative thoughts (Joormann & Siemer, 2011), then C) when inhibiting the
unwanted, to-be-ignored negative information is successful, negative information is less
likely to enter or occupy WM for further processing (Joormann, 2004), which is the
critical process of positive reappraisal. In other words, when inhibition of negative
information is successful, WM is made available to store and process positive
information, which allows individuals the opportunity to generate positive
reinterpretation.
In addition to inhibition, attention switching might be another cognitive ability
that is examined in the negative affective priming task. Given that this negative affective
priming task requires participants to disengage from the previous prime trial and quickly
engage in the current test trial, a high level of inhibition (a longer delay between the
prime and the test trial) might in fact reflect difficulties in disengaging attention from the
previous priming trial and attending to the subsequent test trial (i.e., high switching
costs). On the other hand, a low level of inhibition (a short delay or no delay between
trials) might reflect better attention switching between trials (i.e., low switching costs).
Regarding how attention switching might be involved in the process of positive
reappraisal, I propose two possibilities, which are as follows: First, high switching costs
are typically interpreted as less skilled performance, and thus imply that the person who
has high switching costs experiences greater difficulties in both diverting attention away
from irrelevant information and attending to relevant information in the process of
reappraisal. Second, high switching costs might in fact reflect a more cautious and
detailed oriented strategy in information processing, in which attention is devoted to the
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details of information. In the process of positive reappraisal, the person with higher
switching costs may process or evaluate each piece of information carefully before
moving on to the next. Evidence from a recent study seems to support the second
possibility. McRae et al. (2011) found that high switching costs (longer response time in
switching between the global vs. local cues) were associated with better ability to
reappraise. In addition, they found that high switching costs were associated with high
accuracy rates in the switching task. Thus, it is possible that these participants prioritized
accuracy over speed when implementing reappraisal strategies in emotion regulation.
Last, I propose that this specific type of inhibition, identified by the negative
affective priming effect, might work in conjunction with other subtypes of inhibition. For
example, the well-known prepotent response inhibition (measured by the emotional
Stroop task) might be used to support the complex inhibition processes involved in
positive reappraisal. Prepotent response inhibition refers to the ability to override habitual
responses to the most noticeable but goal-irrelevant information, such as the ability to
suppress the impulse to process the semantic meaning of a negative word when the task
goal is to read the color of the negative word. In the process of positive reappraisal,
prepotent response inhibition may allow attention to be re-directed from the goalirrelevant negative information toward goal-relevant positive information. Therefore,
individuals do not perseverate on goal-irrelevant negative information, but direct their
attention toward positive information to generate positive thoughts to reappraise. In
summary, the type of inhibition, identified by the negative affective priming effect, and
prepotent response inhibition might work together in the complex process of positive
reappraisal to inhibit negative information and to enhance the accessibility and
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processing of positive information. This proposal will need to be examined carefully in
future studies. Overall, even though the association between inhibition of negative
information and PRA was not found, this study provides a valuable insight toward the
complex inhibitory processes involved in positive reappraisal.
WM Memory and PRA. Regarding how WM for valence-specific information
contributes to PRA, the results differed from what was predicted: WM for positive
information did not contribute to PRA, either in a linear or curvilinear relationship. The
following paragraphs discuss what might have contributed to this non-significant
association.
Backward word span task. Concerning the measure of WM, it is possible that the
demand of WM in the backward word span task does not equal the demand of WM
required in positive reappraisal. It is important to note that WM is composed of multiple
subsystems, including the central executive and three storage subsystems—the
phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad, and episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000, 2001).
To successfully reappraise, individuals need to engage the central executive system and
at least one storage subsystem. However, the backward word span task might not involve
the central executive subsystem to the same extent as other WM tasks. Some researchers
have proposed that the backward word span task relies mostly on the phonological loop
for storage and reordering (Conway et al., 2005). They argue that even though the task
requirement that goes beyond mere storage, the requirement of reordering words is not
enough to engage the central executive system to turn this task into a WM task (Cantor,
Engle, & Hamilton, 1991). This could be due to the very brief time allowed for
information processing in the backward word span task so that the processing is not
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brought online as it is in other WM tasks (Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005). Consistent with
this argument, a factor analysis showed that the backward word span task loaded on a
different factor from other WM span tasks (e.g., Operation span, Reading span) that
involve dual processes—the central executive and one other storage subsystem; instead,
the backward word span task loaded on the same factor as short-term memory tasks that
only involve storage (e.g., forward digit span tasks) (Engle et al., 1999).
However, I think using the backward word span task to investigate the underlying
cognitive processes in reappraisal still makes sense on a theoretical level because the
process of retrieving and manipulating valence-specific information in the backward
word span task mirrors the process of positive reappraisal. They both involve storing,
manipulating, and updating valence-specific information. I believe that increasing the
difficulty level of the backward word span task would make the WM demand in the task
more similar to the WM demand in positive reappraisal. One way to adjust the task
difficulty is to require individuals to recite emotional words in alphabetical rather than
reverse order. This adjustment borrows the task design from another WM task, the alpha
span task, which requires generating a list of letters by reordering the first letter of a
string of words in alphabetical order (Craik, 1986). Oberauer, Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm,
and Wittmann (2000) compared the alpha span task to the backward digit span task. They
suggested that the alpha span task required mental representations of all of the words in
the list and their mutual relationship to each other based on their alphabetical order,
whereas the backward digit span task only required mental representations of two
adjacent digits and the relative relationships between them. In summary, the WM demand
of the backward word span task might need to be adjusted to a level more equivalent to
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that of the WM demand of positive reappraisal to increase the likelihood of finding
significant correlations between WM and PRA.
Valence-specific EF and PRA. Overall, the first part of the research
demonstrated that two subcomponents of valence-specific EF do not contribute to PRA.
The null results might be taken as evidence for the possibility that reappraisal simply
does not demand a great deal of cognitive resources, and thus the role of EF in PRA is
minimal. This argument is based on previous evidence showing that reappraisal preserves
more cognitive resources than suppression, and so individuals who use reappraisal to
regulate emotions perform better in subsequent cognitive tasks (Richards & Gross, 2000).
This argument seems fair, but might require reevaluation. I propose the reason that
reappraisal does not deplete cognitive resources is because of early engagement of the
strategy, not because of a lack of need for cognitive control. Reappraisal is an antecedentfocused emotion regulation strategy, as opposed to suppression, which is a responsefocused emotion regulation strategy (Gross, 1998). Individuals need to exert executive
control during reappraisal in order to regulate their emotions. For example, Ochsner
(2005) found overlapping brain regions between reappraisal and EF; Schmeichel et al.
(2008) found a positive association between WM and reappraisal. Both pieces of
evidence support the notion that reappraisal involves high-level cognitive processes.
In line with this argument, emerging evidence demonstrates the role of executive
control over valence-specific materials in reappraisal. Malooly, Genet, and Siemer (2012)
demonstrated that affective flexibility, measured by a modified switching paradigm, is
closely related to individuals’ ability to down-regulate the emotion of sadness in
reappraisal. The modified switching paradigm could potentially involve both inhibition
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and WM because participants need to remember and alternate between two sets of rules
by bringing the task-relevant rule online while suppressing the task-irrelevant one and
updating rules when necessary. Results showed that participants who are better at
attending to goal-relevant neutral information and disengaging from the goal-irrelevant
negative context experience a lower level of sadness while reappraising a sad film.
Similar to my current study, Malooly et al. (2012) investigated the role of
valence-specific EF beyond general EF (neutral materials) in reappraisal. We both
recognized the contributions of high-level cognitive processes to reappraisal, as indicated
in previous work, and further examined the role of valence-specific EF in reappraisal.
However, we took different approaches to investigating the cognitive aspect of
reappraisal. These different characteristics and designs between our studies may help
explain the discrepancy in findings.
First, I examined similar but different cognitive processes: I investigated two
subcomponents of valence-specific EF (inhibition of negative information and WM for
positive information) based on a dual-process model, while Malooly et al. (2012) focused
on affective flexibility based on a similar rationale that reappraisal involves the flexible
executive control over emotional materials. Their task could potentially measure
inhibition and WM at the same time and thus better capture the complex nature of
executive control ability that is involved in reappraisal, leading to a significant
association with reappraisal effectiveness.
Second, in the sad context, I measured the up-regulation of positive emotions
rather than the down-regulation of negative emotions. Positive and negative emotions
have been suggested to be orthogonal constructs (Russell, 2003). That is, positive
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emotions can coexist with negative emotions and can work independently from negative
emotions; feeling negative emotions does not exclude individuals from experiencing
positive emotions. An example of the coexistence of positive and negative emotions can
be seen in Folkman (1997), in which caregivers/partners of AIDS patients reported
positive emotions along with negative emotions during the course of caregiving and
bereavement, and the level of their positive emotions was comparable to a college sample
that did not experience unusual stress. Similarly, the reappraisal ability to up-regulate
positive emotions and the reappraisal ability to down-regulate negative emotions do not
have to travel synchronously. For example, in my study, the ability to increase the
emotion of optimism was not associated with the ability to decrease the emotion of
sadness.
In a negative context, however, negative emotions are more salient than positive
emotions, and there is more room for negative emotions to be down-regulated than for
positive emotions to be up-regulated. In other words, there is a ceiling effect in terms of
the amount that positive emotions can be elevated by positive reappraisal. This idea is
supported by our data. For example, the average level of happiness reported in positive
reappraisal was fairly low and very little variance was shown. Obviously, it is unlikely to
get a significant association between one variable with a limited variance (PRAHappiness) and another variable with a widespread variance that is normally distributed
(my EF measures), as is the case in my study.
Third, the other difference between my study and Malooly et al. (2012) is the type
of emotional materials being processed in EF tasks. I used emotional words in the EF
tasks, whereas Malooly et al. used emotion-eliciting pictures (International Affective
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Picture Set) in their EF task. Cognitive processes on emotional information in pictures
seem to be more parallel to those involved in reappraisal, compared to cognitive
processes on emotional words. This could be why Malooly et al. found a significant
association between valence-specific EF and reappraisal while I failed to do so. In
summary, the similarity between the types of emotional materials processed in EF and in
reappraisal could potentially influence the degree to which these two processes correlate
with each other.
II. Valence-specific Executive Function and Positive Reappraisal Ability across
Adulthood
The second part of this research aimed to investigate whether the relationships
between valence-specific EF and PRA change across adulthood. Major findings are
discussed in the following three sections.
Age and PRA. I examined the developmental trajectory of PRA across
adulthood. Based on the socio-emotional selective theory, older adults are motivated to
preserve emotional well-being and are thought to have stronger emotion regulation
abilities in achieving emotionally meaningful goals (Carstensen et al., 1999), particularly
when positive reappraisal is used (Shiota & Levenson, 2009). Therefore, I predicted that
PRA increases with age.
Among three types of PRA investigated in this study, the ability to increase the
emotion of love (PRA-Love) was found to increase with age, but not the ability to
increase the emotions of happiness and optimism (PRA-Happiness and PRA-Optimism).
The exclusive age effect on PRA-Love implies that not all positive emotions are desired
equally in old age. In this case, the emotion of love contains a unique social component
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that is not shared by the other two types of positive emotions. The increased ability to upregulate the emotion of love in old age suggests that older adults desire to stay socially
connected and engaged, even when they are in a stressful or sad situation. This idea is
consistent with the socio-emotional selective theory, which emphasizes older adults’
desire for emotionally meaningful goals (Carstensen et al., 2003). Thus, it makes sense
that older adults have better abilities to up-regulate discrete positive emotion (love),
rather than a broad spectrum of positive emotions. In contrast, the emotions of happiness
and optimism do not appear to involve this social component. The emotion of happiness
describes a general state of positive affect within an individual and the emotion of
optimism carries expectations of improvement or projections into the future, which is not
compatible with older adults’ immediate emotional goals. Thus, the lack of a social
component may be the reason that the age effect was not found in the ability to upregulate happiness and optimism.
Age and valence-specific EF. I examined the developmental trajectory of
valence-specific EF over the course of adulthood. No age difference in valence-specific
EF was found.
Inhibition and age. Inhibition of neutral information remained constant across
adulthood as predicted; however, contrary to my hypotheses, inhibition of negative
information was not found to decrease with age and inhibition of positive information
was not found to increase with age. The absence of age difference in inhibition of
valence-specific information might be due to two reasons. First, the negative affective
priming task does not depend on the PFC but the posterior cortex and the ventral or
occipital-temporal visual pathway instead (Connelly & Hasher, 1993). These cortical
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regions do not decline with age as rapidly as the PFC. Therefore, inhibition of valencespecific information, measured by the negative affective priming task, was not found to
change with age. Second, the negative affective priming task in my study instructed
participants to evaluate the valence of the information (valence evaluation) rather than to
evaluate whether these emotional words described themselves (self-reference evaluation).
Previous studies have suggested that self-reference evaluation is the key component in
detecting the impairment or decline in inhibition of valence-specific information (Segal,
1988; Joormann, 2004). Thus, it is possible that valence evaluation used in my study was
not sensitive enough to detect the age difference in inhibition of valence-specific
information. In summary, the negative affective priming task is not based on the age
sensitive PFC and does not involve self-reference evaluation. Both features of the task
may contribute to the non-significant relationship between age and inhibition of valencespecific information.
WM and age. Contrary to my hypotheses, WM for neutral, positive, and negative
information were not found to decline with age. This could be because the WM measure,
the backward word span task, does not demand cognitive resources in processing (update
and manipulation) to the extent that most other WM tasks do (e.g., the operation span).
Specifically, the demand on the central executives, which is the key feature of processing,
is only minimal in the backward word span task (Engle et al., 1999). Therefore, it is
possible that the age-related decline in WM (mostly the central executives) was not
captured by the backward word span task in my study. Furthermore, Bopp and
Verhaeghen (2005) have concluded that the size of the decline in backward word span
task is smaller than that in other WM tasks. Therefore, even if there was an age-related
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decline in WM in my study, it is possible that the decline would have been too small to
be detected by the backward word span task. Considering that my older adult sample was
relatively small, it is probable that the statistical power was too low to detect the
relationships between age and WM for valence-specific information.
The relationships between PRA and valence-specific EF across age. I
investigated the relationships between inhibition of negative information and PRA as a
function of age. Older adults are highly motivated to work on their emotional goals, and
yet, with declining cognitive functions, they must use whatever cognitive resources are
available and easily accessible to support their abilities in regulating emotions. In this
case, inhibition is a promising candidate because it has been found to be resistant to agerelated declines (Verhaeghen, 2011). In particular, I predicted that the relationships for
the relatively well-preserved inhibition of negative information and PRA should increase
with age. As predicted, across all types of PRA, older adults with higher inhibition of
negative information showed higher levels of PRA than their counterparts with lower
inhibition of negative information; on the other hand, younger adults with higher
inhibition of negative information showed lower levels of PRA than their counterparts
with lower inhibition of negative information.
The significant interaction effect of age and inhibition of negative information on
PRA is a robust finding in that the interaction effect was found across all three types of
PRA. In addition, a stringent p value based on Bonferroni correction was applied to
minimize the type I error. Thus, on a statistical level, I am confident that the interaction
effect between age and inhibition of negative information on PRA is not a spurious
finding.
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The pattern in younger adults was not predicted. I suspect that younger adults
might use a different process in positive reappraisal than older adults. When asked to
reappraise, younger adults might rely on the negative information to generate positive
interpretations. In other words, younger adults need to reference the negative information
so that they can comprehend and process the negative information more thoroughly
before finding positive meaning in a negative event (i.e., positive reappraisal). To do so,
negative information needs to be kept active, not inhibited. Thus, for younger adults,
better inhibition of negative information could interfere with this reappraisal process.
This would explain why in younger adults, greater inhibition of negative information is
related to a lower level of PRA, or younger adults with lower inhibition of negative
information actually showed higher PRA. Findings from two recent studies seem to lend
some support to this proposal: Isaacowitz, Toner, and Neupert (2009) found that younger
adults with high attentional control abilities gazed toward negative information and away
from positive information to support emotion regulation. Similarly, Noh, Lohani, and
Isaacowitz (2011) found that younger adults experienced mood elevation when they
directed gaze toward the most negative aspect of the stimuli. In summary, for younger
adults to reappraise successfully, they rely on processing negative information to generate
positive meaning. This is one potential explanation why inhibition of negative
information is negatively associated with PRA for younger adults.
Furthermore, I consider the possibility of attention switching as an additional
explanation for the negative association between PRA and inhibition of negative
information for younger adults. For younger adults who performed more poorly in
inhibition of negative information (a short delay or no delay between trials), I propose
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that they might actually be better at switching between trials. In this case, better
switching ability is associated with higher PRA. This association can be explained as
follows: A) better switching indicates better ability to disengage from irrelevant
information from the previous trial and to direct attention to relevant information in the
current trial, and thus B) younger adults with better switching ability are less likely to
perseverate on irrelevant negative information and more likely to attend to relevant
positive information during the process of reappraisal. Taken together, for younger
adults, better switching ability might help support PRA.
Overall, the differential pattern shown in younger and older adults suggests that
the relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA change as a function of age. This
finding not only serves as a solid reminder that any research finding in young adults is
not necessarily generalizable to other age groups, but also points out important and
different mechanisms that are employed by younger and older adults to efficiently
regulate emotions. That is, younger adults do not rely on inhibiting negative information
to reappraise, whereas older adults do. Admittedly, this unexpected but robust finding
will need to be warranted by future replication.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions
Strengths. My study effectively addresses limitations in previous literature and
advances our understanding about positive reappraisal in the following ways.
First, this study investigates the individual differences in PRA. The investigation
of PRA supplements our current knowledge of reappraisal, most of which has been
understood in the construct of trait reappraisal. In this study, I demonstrate how PRA is
conceptualized and can be validly measured via an experimental paradigm. The construct
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of PRA is a direct and more accurate measure of an individual’s true ability to use
positive reappraisal to up-regulate positive emotions, in contrast to an individual’s selfclaimed habitual use of reappraisal in daily life (trait reappraisal), which is difficult to
verify.
There are two potential future directions for this line of work. One is to include
physiological measures along with a self-report of emotional experience. This additional
information will provide opportunities to investigate how physiological responses change
along with self-reported positive emotions and to better understand the constituent
components of positive emotions. The other future direction would be to examine
emotion reactivity as a moderator in the relationships between valence-specific EF and
PRA. In my study, the emotion reactivity of positive emotions was included as a control
variable for PRA, and the emotion reactivity of negative emotion (sadness) was included
to ensure that the sad films induced moderate levels of sadness; whether the relationships
between valence-specific EF and PRA change as a function of emotion reactivity was not
yet examined—the emotion reactivity of negative emotions (sadness), in particular. To
put it differently: Do people with low or high reactivity levels of sadness engage valencespecific EF in the process of positive reappraisal differently? Regarding inhibition of
negative information, I suspect that people with higher levels of sadness reactivity rely on
inhibition of negative information to a greater extent than people with lower levels of
sadness reactivity to up-regulate positive emotions. This might be because higher levels
of sadness reactivity need to be brought under control for some positive emotions to be
unraveled. This investigation can help us better understand the orthogonal structure of

	
  

84

positive and negative emotions and gain more insight into the role of emotion reactivity
in the relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA.
Second, this study is the first to examine individual differences in the ability to
up-regulate positive emotions in a negative context. Traditionally, negative emotion has
been the main concern in psychological research due to its close relationship to
psychopathology or ill-being. Here, the emphasis on positive emotion and related
cognitive processes inform the current body of knowledge in terms of promoting wellbeing in stressful contexts. In addition, the presence of positive emotions has been shown
to relate to individuals’ well-being and health outcomes (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000).
Therefore, it is important for future studies to investigate the concurrent and predictive
validity of PRA and see how this construct relates to overall emotional well-being in
daily life or emotional well-being after the onset of the negative event.
Third, the current study is different from previous studies in regard to the EF
measures. The current study includes valence-specific EF to investigate its relationship
with PRA, whereas previous studies employed measures of general EF (EF with neutral
materials) to investigate its role in reappraisal (e.g., McRae et al., 2011) or other emotion
regulation strategies (e.g., Schmeichel et al., 2008). Including valence-specific
information in cognitive control is believed to be especially relevant to the processes in
reappraisal (Malooly et al., 2012). Even though my study does not show significant
associations between valence-specific EF and PRA as expected, it still provides important
insight and questions for future studies to pursue.
Fourth, this study includes a community sample across ages, rather than samples
from college students only. This diverse sample provides the unique opportunity to
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investigate the relationship between emotion regulation and EF across adulthood and to
generalize the results to a wider population.
Limitations. This study, admittedly, is not without limitations. First, this research
relies on correlational data to address the relationship between valence-specific EF and
PRA. Correlational methods do not allow us to draw causal inferences between these
constructs. It is important for future research to manipulate valence-specific EF and see
how it affects PRA. Nonetheless, correlational research is still an important and necessary
first step in addressing the potential role of valence-specific EF in PRA.
Second, the cross-sectional design in this research cannot rule out the possibility
that age differences in PRA and in the relationships between PRA and inhibition are due
to cohort effects. It is possible that older adults have experienced specific historical
events or era-specific culture that has acclimated them to a specific way of regulating
emotions. The exclusive cohort experience could also influence the way older adults
perceive emotional stimuli presented in the study or the process involved in reappraisal. It
is important for future research to use a longitudinal design to fully explore the
developmental changes within individuals across adulthood. However, the cross-sectional
design of this research is still valuable and contributes to our understanding of the
relationship between valence-specific EF and PRA. This is because the cross-sectional
design covers a wide age range of participants and allows the results to be generalizable
to a wider population of adults.
Third, although a wide age range of participants was included in the study, the
maximum age of older adults did not exceed 72 years. It is important to include older
adults in their 80s, 90s, and beyond, if possible, because their abilities could differ
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dramatically from those in their 70s (cf. Shiota & Levenson, 2009). Conceivably,
individuals’ physical and mental health may deteriorate at an increasing rate after age 80.
These older old adults may also deal with frequent loneliness and isolation due to the loss
of a significant other, siblings, or long-term friends. To cope with these irrevocable
losses, the older old adults might develop a different emotional profile from the younger
old adults. For example, they might have an overall lower level of PRA than the younger
old adults. In addition, they might show a greater discrepancy in different types of PRA. I
suspect that the older old adults would show higher levels of PRA regarding peace and
calmness, but lower levels of PRA regarding optimism and hopefulness than younger old
adults (the emphasis on peace and calmness is useful at this life stage because it helps
cope with the awareness of impending death).
Fourth, I measured three discrete positive emotions: happiness, love, and
optimism. They were chosen because they are the targeted emotions in the positive
reappraisal instruction. However, other types of positive emotions that were untested here
might disclose other crucial components of PRA, and thus would be important to include
in future studies. These different types of positive emotions may include, for example,
those with a social aspect (compassion), those relating to meaning making (inspiration),
or those describing a mental state (calmness). Including these additional types of positive
emotions is particularly relevant while reappraising in a sad context, where a dyad
grapples with loss of a relationship (as is the common theme in our film clips). This is
because the reappraisal of loss may conceivably involve compassionate feelings toward
others, inspiration being found in the process of seeking positive meaning, or a calm state
being reached throughout the negative experience. Furthermore, having more positive
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emotions to work with will allow for opportunities to establish the construct of positive
emotions and to test the construct through different age groups.
Lastly, given that this study belongs to a larger project, only one task was
included to assess each subcomponent of EF: The negative (affective) priming task for
inhibition of valence-specific information and the backward word span task for WM
regarding valence-specific information. This approach imposed a significant threat to
validity in assessing executive function in its entirety. Specifically, inhibition
encompasses a wide variety of functions or processes, such as the negative priming
effect, prepotent response inhibition, and inhibition of return, (Kok, 1999; Miyake, 2001;
Verhaeghen, 2011); several distinct brain circuits are activated in inhibition processes,
based on various paradigms (Kok, 1999). Similarly, WM can be assessed in a variety of
tasks: by a “dual task” (e.g., N-back or operation span) or a “simple task” (e.g., backward
digit span task) (Yuan, Steedle, Shavelson, Alonzo, & Oppezzo, 2006). The current
consensus on WM prefers dual tasks over simple tasks because simple tasks rely more on
storage than on manipulating or updating information. Dual tasks, on the other hand, tap
into the updating process, which is the essence of WM. The WM measure used in my
study, the backward word span task, has been suggested to belong to the simple task
category (Engle et al., 1999; Conway et al., 2005) but could also be classified as a dual
task due to the processing of reversed word order. The content and construct validity of
the backward word span task still need to be established.
Therefore, to examine the role of EF in PRA, a more comprehensive approach
that uses multiple tasks for each cognitive component would capture the “true ability” of
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each function more accurately and better reflect the complex cognitive processes
underlying positive reappraisal.
Conclusion
This study aims to examine the relationships between valence-specific EF and
PRA across adulthood. No association between PRA and inhibition of negative
information or WM for positive information was found. However, the construct of PRA,
the measures of valence-specific EF, and implications are discussed in detail. These
discussions point to important future directions for research in reappraisal, such as the
inclusion of a variety of valence-specific EF tasks and positive emotions. Importantly, my
findings indicate that older adults are better at up-regulating the emotion of love than
younger adults while engaging positive reappraisal. In addition, older adults appear to use
inhibition of negative information to support their ability to up-regulate positive emotions
in positive reappraisal, which is different from younger and middle-aged adults. These
findings contribute to our knowledge of the interaction between cognitive and emotional
aging. Potential explanations, methodological and theoretical implications, and future
directions are discussed.
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Appendix A

Table 1. Exclusion Criteria and Final Sample
Exclusion Criteria
Did not follow reappraisal
instruction
Physically disabled
Did not complete the lab session
Reported no sadness during the
baseline sad film
Final Sample

	
  

Excluded n

N

4
1
59
25
250

108

Table 2. Sample Characteristics
a

Age
Race
White or European Americans
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaska
Native
Asian Americans
Pacific Islanders
Mixed
Missing/ Did not specify
Annual Income
< $10,000
$10,000-$20,000
$20,000-$30,000
$30,000-$40,000
$40,000-$50,000
$50,000-$70,000
$70,000-$100,000
> $100,000
Missing/ Did not report
Education Level Completed
Partial high school or less
High school graduate
Partial college
College graduate
Graduate degree

n
250
n
210
9

M (SD)
40.84 (12.37)
%
84
3.6

6
5
2
16
2
n
11
21
19
25
23
42
44
31
34
n
7
10
85
104
44

2.4
2
.8
6.4
.8
%
4.4
8.4
7.6
10.0
9.2
16.8
17.6
12.4
13.6
%
2.8
4.0
34.0
41.6
17.6

Note. Agea is noted in years.
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Measure
1. ER-Happiness
1.50(1.00)

M (SD)
1.12(.32)
.318**

.231**

1
-

.249**

.275**

-

2

-.009

.151**

-

.494**

.403**

.486**

-

6

Table 3. Summary of Intercorrelations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Emotion Reactivity (ER) and Positive Reappraisal Ability
(PRA) by Age Group

2. ER-Love
1.55(1.05)
.124†
.270**

.161*

5

3. ER-Optimism
2.18(1.68)
.088
.123

4

4. PRA-Happiness
4.57(2.79)
.033

3

5. PRA-Love
4.31(2.37)

M (SD)
1.10(.30)

.255*

1
-

.245*

.092

.476**

.326**

-

-

6. PRA-Optimism

Note. All participants, n =231, † p < .07, *p < = .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed).
Measure
1. ER-Happiness
1.40(.93)

.169

.182

-.135

.560**

6

2. ER-Love
1.42(.92)

.071

.250*

.111

5

3. ER-Optimism

2.10(1.61)

.224*

.141

4

4. PRA-Happiness

3.96(2.73)

.052

3

5. PRA-Love

3.98(2.29)

2

6. PRA-Optimism

Note. Younger adults (18 to 36), n =90, † p < .07, *p < = .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed).
(continued)
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3. ER-Optimism

2. ER-Love

Measure
1. ER-Happiness

2.07(1.50)

1.44(.84)

1.59(1.11)

M (SD)
1.12(.33)

.126

.236*

.459**

.271**

1
-

.077

.265**

.330**

.297**

-

2

.243*

.112

.175

-

.421**

.353**

.577**

-

5

4. PRA-Happiness
4.70(2.75)
.112

4

5. PRA-Love
4.40(2.28)

3

6. PRA-Optimism

Measure
1. ER-Happiness
1.53(.93)

M (SD)
1.14(.30)
.292

.032

1
-

.161

.300

-

-.044

.289

-

.558**

.400**

.599**

-

Note. Middle-aged adults (37 to 55), n =105, † p < .07, *p < = .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

2. ER-Love
1.47(.92)

-.077

.291

.053

5

3. ER-Optimism

2.06(1.61)

-.353*

.199

4

4. PRA-Happiness

4.94(2.73)

-.237

3

5. PRA-Love

4.17(2.29)

2

6. PRA-Optimism

Note. Older adults (56 to 72), n =36, † p < .07, *p < = .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

6

-

6

-
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2. Inhibition-Positive

Variable
1. Inhibition-Neutral
10.63

7.66

M
8.26

1.64

36.94

39.23

SD
29.66

-.06

-.05

.07

1.58*

1
-

-.01

.01

-.01

.05

-

2

-.12

-.08

.05

-

.537**

.594**

.538**

-

M
12.36
41.22

SD
31.88
.047

.342**

1
-

-.063

-.010

-

-.094

.110

-

.623**

.586**

.549**

-

6

-

-

6

Table 4. Summary of Intercorrelations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Valence-Specific EF Variables: Inhibition and Working
Memory (WM) by Age Group

3. Inhibition-Negative
5.55
1.41
-.03

Variable
1. Inhibition-Neutral
5.55
34.48

-.101

-.130

-.106

5

4. WM-Neutral
5.86
1.35

4

5. WM-Positive
5.46

3

6. WM-Negative

Note. All participants, n =231 * p < .05. (two –tailed) ; ** p < .01. (two-tailed).

2. Inhibition-Positive
4.13

1.76

-.074

-.051

5

3. Inhibition-Negative
5.58

1.45

-.061

4

4. WM-Neutral
6.00

1.35

3

5. WM-Positive
5.39

2

6. WM-Negative

Note. Younger adults (18 to 36), n =89, * p < .05. (two –tailed), ** p < .01. (two-tailed).
(continued)
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Variable
1. Inhibition-Neutral
7.79

M
2.36
37.72

37.37

SD
25.02

-.051

-.001

.023

-

.000

-.012

.123

-

-.288**

-.143

-.164

-

.430**

.597**

.498**

-

5

2. Inhibition-Positive
17.81
1.65
-.112
-.042

4

3. Inhibition-Negative
5.59
1.32
.007

3

4. WM-Neutral
5.83
1.27

2

5. WM-Positive
5.58

1

6. WM-Negative

Note. Middle-aged adults (37 to 55), n= 96, * p < .05. (two –tailed) ; ** p <.01. (two-tailed).

3. Inhibition-Negative

2. Inhibition-Positive

Variable
1. Inhibition-Neutral

5.54

8.49

9.10

M
16.08

1.08

1.56

51.34

38.87

SD
35.24

.055

.115

.164

.472*

-.094

1
-

.373

.301

.179

.05

-

2

.077

.033

.312

-

.698**

.647**

.732**

-

5

4. WM-Neutral
5.61

1.34

4

5. WM-Positive
5.48

3

6. WM-Negative

Note. Older adults (56 to 72), n = 23, * p < .05. (two–tailed), ** p < .01. (two-tailed).
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Table 5.1. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Neutral
Information (Inhibition-Neutral), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER).
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Inhibition-Neutral
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Inhibition-Neutral
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Inhibition-Neutral

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.129

1.795

.074

R2
.017
.025

-.090

.199

B

-1.278
PRA-Love
t

.229

3.262

.001

-.020

.779

B

-.280
PRA-Optimism
t

.286

4.512

.000

p

R2
.053
.053

p

R2
.094
.094

-.021

-.310

114

.757

	
  
Table 5.2. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Positive
Information (Inhibition-Positive), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER)
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Inhibition-Positive
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Inhibition-Positive
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Inhibition-Positive

	
  

PRA-Happiness
t

B
.137

2.213

p

R2
.020

.028
.020

.005
B
.247

.084
PRA-Love
t

.933

3.952

.000

p

R2
.061
.062

.034

.541
PRA-Optimism
t

B
.252

4.121

.589
p

R2
.065

.000
.065

-.007

-.111

115

.912

	
  
Table 5.3. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Negative
Information (Inhibition-Negative), Controlling Emotion Reactivity (ER)
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Inhibition-Negative
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Inhibition-Negative
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Inhibition-Negative

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

.139

2.241

p

R2
.020

.026
.021

.033
B

.537
PRA-Love
t

.244

3.924

.592
p

R2
.061

.000
.062

.037
B

.588
PRA-Optimism
t

.252

4.122

.557
p

R2
.065

.000
.065

-.002

-.028

116

.978

	
  
Table 6.1. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Neutral
Information (WM-Neutral), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER)
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
WM-Neutral
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
WM-Neutral
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
WM-Neutral

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.087

.1372

.171

R2
.008
.013

-.064

.306

B

-1025
PRA-Love
t

.232

3.758

.000

-.125

.045

B

-2.019
PRA-Optimism
t

.248

4.076

.000

p

R2
.063
.080

p

R2
.066
.075

-.094

-1.530

117

.127

	
  
Table 6.2. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Positive
Information (WM-Positive), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER)
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
WM-Positive
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
WM-Positive
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
WM-Positive

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.088

1.388

.166

R2
.008
.009

-.015

.810

B

-.240
PRA-Love
t

.240

3.905

.000

-.100

.107

B

-1.602
PRA-Optimism
t

.253

4.156

.000

p

R2
.063
.074

p

R2
.066
.069

.050

.819

118

.414

	
  
Table 6.3. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Negative
Information (WM-Negative), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER).
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
WM-Negative
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
WM-Negative
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
WM-Negative

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.091

1.433

.153

R2
.008
.011

.050

.434

B

.784
PRA-Love
t

.241

3.889

.000

-.060

.334

B

-.969
PRA-Optimism
t

.252

4.142

.000

p

R2
.063
.067

p

R2
.066
.072

.079

1.297

119

.196

	
  
Table 7.1. Curvilinear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Neutral
Information (Inhibition-Neutral) and Inhibition of Neutral Information Squared
(Inhibition-Neutral2), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER).
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Inhibition-Neutral
Step 3
Inhibition-Neutral2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Inhibition-Neutral
Step 3
Inhibition-Neutral2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Inhibition-Neutral
Step 3
Inhibition-Neutral2

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.120

1.663

.104

-.093

-1.324

.187

.021

.569

B

.571
PRA-Love
t

.233

3.341

.001

R2
.017
.025
.027

p

R2
.053
.053

-.008

-.112

.911

-.046

.226

B

-1.215
PRA-Optimism
t

.294

4.565

.000

.060

p

R2
.094
.094

-.025

-.366

.714
.096

-.030

-.733

120

.464

	
  
Table 7.2. Curvilinear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Positive
Information (Inhibition-Positive) and Inhibition of Positive Information Squared
(Inhibition-Positive2), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER)
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Inhibition-Positive
Step 3
Inhibition-Positive2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Inhibition-Positive
Step 3
Inhibition-Positive2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Inhibition-Positive
Step 3
Inhibition-Positive2

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.141

2.272

.024

-.006

-.095

.925

.039

.338

B

.960
PRA-Love
t

.247

3.949

.000

R2
.020
.020
.024

p

R2
.061
.062

.031

.489

.625

.009

.830

B

.215
PRA-Optimism
t

.251

4.091

.000

.062

p

R2
.065
.065

-.011

-.182

.856
.066

.017

.416

121

.678

	
  
Table 7.3. Curvilinear Regression Analyses:Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Negative
Information (Inhibition-Negative) and Inhibition of Negative Information Squared
(Inhibition-Negative2), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER)
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Inhibition-Negative
Step 3
Inhibition-Negative2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Inhibition-Negative
Step 3
Inhibition-Negative2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Inhibition-Negative
Step 3
Inhibition-Negative2

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.140

2.252

.025

.038

.598

.550

R2
.020
.021
.022

.016
B

.409
PRA-Love
t

.244

3.903

.683
p

R2
.061

.000
.062

.041

.637

.525
.063

.018
B

.442
PRA-Optimism
t

.252

4.135

.659
p

R2
.065

.000
.065

.005

.086

.931
.067

.026

.442

122

.500

	
  
Table 8.1. Curvilinear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Neutral
Information (WM-Neutral) and WM for Neutral Information Squared (WM-Neutral2),
Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER)
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
WM-Neutral
Step 3
WM-Neutral2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
WM-Neutral
Step 3
WM-Neutral2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
WM-Neutral
Step 3
WM-Neutral2

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.085

.1341

.181

-.055

.859

.391

-.032

.464

B

-.734
PRA-Love
t

.233

3.749

.000

R2
.008
.013
.015

p

R2
.063
.080

-.128

-2.013

.045

.009

.833

B

.211
PRA-Optimism
t

.247

4.044

.000

.080

p

R2
.066
.075

-.093

-1.474

.142
.075

-.003

-.005

123

.940

	
  
Table 8.2. Curvilinear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Positive
Information (WM-Positive) and WM for Positive Information Squared (WMPositive2), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER)
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
WM-Positive
Step 3
WM-Positive2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
WM-Positive
Step 3
WM-Positive2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
WM-Positive
Step 3
WM-Positive2

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.089

1.395

.164

-.016

-.259

.796

.010

.788

B

.270
PRA-Love
t

.241

3.921

.000

R2
.008
.009
.009

p

R2
.063
.074

-.093

-1.501

.135

-.045

.222

B

-1.224
PRA-Optimism
t

.249

4.056

.000

.080

p

R2
.066
.069

.053

.852

.395
.071

-.027

-.741

124

.459

	
  
Table 8.3. Curvilinear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Negative
Information (WM-Negative) and WM for Negative Information Squared (WMNegative2), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER).
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
WM-Negative
Step 3
WM-Negative2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
WM-Negative
Step 3
WM-Negative2
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
WM-Negative
Step 3
WM-Negative2

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.090

1.412

.159

.049

.746

.456

-005

.922

B

-.098
PRA-Love
t

.241

3.880

.000

R2
.008
.011
.011

p

R2
.063
.067

-.059

-.925

.356

.004

.929

B

.089
PRA-Optimism
t

.252

4.099

.000

.067

p

R2
.066
.072

.074

1.180

.239
.073

-.017

-.375

125

.708

	
  
Table 9.1. Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and Inhibition of Neutral
Information (Inhibition-Neutral), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER).
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Age
Inhibition-Neutral
Step 3
Age* Inhibition-Neutral
NeutNeutralNEUTRAL
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Age
Inhibition-Neutral
Step 3
Age* Inhibition-Neutral
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Age
Inhibition-Neutral
Step 3
Age* Inhibition-Neutral

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.075

1.063

.289

R2
.005
.016

-.003
-.104

-.042
-1.461

.967
.145
.016

-.023

.744

B

-.327
PRA-Love
t

.207

3.006

.003

.171
.005

2.267
.064

.024
.949

p

R2
.050
.080
.089

.099

.161

B

1.406
PRA-Optimism
t

.282

4.417

.000

p

R2
.094
.094

.025
-.022

.341
-.310

.733
.757

-.044

-.641

.522

.096

126

	
  
Table 9.2. Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and Inhibition of Positive
Information (Inhibition-Positive), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER).
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Age
Inhibition-Positive
Step 3
Age* Inhibition-Positive
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Age
Inhibition-Positive
Step 3
Age* Inhibition-Positive
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Age
Inhibition-Positive
Step 3
Age* Inhibition-Positive

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.089

1.432

.153

R2
.008
.009

-.022
.002

-.345
.026

.730
.994
.009

-.011

.863

B

-.173
PRA-Love
t

.234

3.737

.000

.143
.033

2.306
.527

.022
.599

p

R2
.059
.081
.083

.043

.497

B

.680
PRA-Optimism
t

.249

4.062

.000

p

R2
.065
.066

.006
-.002

.095
-.027

.925
.978

.067

1.083

.280

.070

127

	
  
Table 9.3 Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and Inhibition of Negative
Information (Inhibition-Negative), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER).
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Age
Inhibition-Negative
Step 3
Age* Inhibition-Negative
NegatveNegatNegative
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Age
Inhibition-Negative
Step 2
Age* Inhibition-Negative
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Age
Inhibition-Negative
Step 2
Age* Inhibition-Negative

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.088

1.434

.153

R2
.008
.010

-.013
-.002

-.216
-.029

.829
.977
.039

.168

.008

B

2.677
PRA-Love
t

.214

3.503

.001

.150
-.004

2.463
-.064

.014
.949

p

R2
.059
.081
.114

.182

.004

B

2.940
PRA-Optimism
t

.258

4.273

.000

p

R2
.065
.065

.015
-.036

.250
-.577

.803
.565

.181

2.941

.004

.098

128

	
  
Table 10.1. Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and WM for Neutral
Information (WM-Neutral), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER).
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Age
WM-Neutral
Step 3
Age* WM-Neutral
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Age
WM-Neutral
Step 3
Age* WM-Neutral
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Age
WM-Neutral
Step 3
Age* WM-Neutral

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.087

1.372

.171

R2
.008
.013

-.020
-.064

-.331
-1.022

.756
.317
.014

.022

.744

B

-.328
PRA-Love
t

.221

3.601

.000

.164
-.108

2.633
-1.738

.009
.084

p

R2
.063
.106
.106

.019

.769

B

.294
PRA-Optimism
t

.247

4.069

.000

p

R2
.066
.075

.018
-.083

.286
1.337

.775
.182

.102

1.529

.128

.084

129

	
  
Table 10.2. Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and WM for Positive
Information (WM-Positive), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER).
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Age
WM-Positive
Step 3
Age*WM-Positive
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Age
WM-Positive
Step 3
Age*WM-Positive
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Age
WM-Positive
Step 3
Age*WM-Positive

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.088

1.385

.167

R2
.008
.009

-.024
-.025

-.364
-.387

.719
.699
.010

-.039

.533

B

-.594
PRA-Love
t

.229

3.743

.000

.161
-.072

2.560
-1.140

.011
.255

p

R2
.063
.099
.099

.013

.838

B

.205
PRA-Optimism
t

.253

4.134

.000

p

R2
.066
.069

.030
.065

.472
1.108

.673
.310

.061

.951

.343

.073

130

	
  
Table 10.3. Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and WM for Negative
Information (WM-Negative), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER).
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Happiness
Step 2
Age
WM-Negative
Step 3
Age*WM-Negative
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Love
Step 2
Age
WM-Negative
Step 3
Age*WM-Negative
Predictor
Step 1
ER-Optimism
Step 2
Age
WM-Negative
Step 3
Age*WM-Negative

	
  

B

PRA-Happiness
t

p

.091

1.432

.154

R2
.008
.011

-.014
.049

-.224
.765

.823
.445
.011

-.015

.817

B

-.232
PRA-Love
t

.227

3.743

.000

.174
-.052

2.795
-.842

.006
.401

p

R2
.063
.097
.098

.038

.540

B

.613
PRA-Optimism
t

.249

4.070

.000

p

R2
.066
.073

.020
.081

.329
1.328

.742
.185

.039

.628

.531

.074

131

	
  

Appendix B

Inhibition of Negative
Information

Positive Reappraisal Ability
Working Memory for
Positive Information

Figure 1. Dual-processing Model. Inhibition of negative information and working
memory for positive information contribute to Positive reappraisal ability (PRA).
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Figure 2. Schematic presentation of experimental procedure.
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Prime Trial
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key
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Respond
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1000ms
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Respond
(Attribute Evaluation)

RSI

Time
Figure 3a. Negative Priming Task. A prime trial and a test trial are presented.
Participants are asked to attend to the blue word (target) and ignore the red word
(distractor). The time interval between participants’ response and the presentation of
the next trial is called the Response Stimulus Interval (RSI).
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Prime Trial

+
1000ms

sad
happy

Test Trial
Respond
(Valence Evaluation)

+
1000ms

pretty
depressed
Respond
(Valence Evaluation)

RSI

Time

Figure 3b. Negative Affective Priming Task. A prime trial and a test trial are
presented. Participants are asked to attend to the blue word (target) and ignore the red
word (distractor). The time interval between participants’ response and the
presentation of the next trial is called the Response Stimulus Interval (RSI). Adpated
from Joormann, J. (2004). Attentional bias in dysphoria. The role of inhibitory
processes. Cognition and Emotion, 18(1), 125-147.
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Figure 4. Positive emotion ratings across films and groups. Positive emotion ratings
differ between conditions (baseline vs. reappraisal). Y-axis represents discrete
positive emotions. * p < .05. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.
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Figure 5a. The interaction of Inhibition-Negative and age on PRA-Happiness. Y-axis
represents the PRA-Happiness in z-units. X-axis represents three levels (low,
medium, high) of inhibition of negative information. Values depict estimates at
+1SD, mean, and -1SD for age and inhibition of negative information. Error bars
represent one standard error of the mean. * p < .05, † p < .08.
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Figure 5b. The interaction of Inhibition-Negative and age on PRA-Love. Y-axis
represents the PRA-Love in z-units. X-axis represents three levels (low, medium,
high) of inhibition of negative information. Values depict estimates at +1SD, mean,
and -1SD for age and inhibition of negative information. Error bars represent one
standard error of the mean. * p < .05, † p < .08.
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Figure 5c. The interaction of Inhibition-Negative and age on PRA-Optimism. Y-axis
represents the PRA-Optimism in z-units. X-axis represents three levels (low, medium,
high) of inhibition of negative information. Values depict estimates at +1SD, mean,
and -1SD for age and inhibition of negative information. Error bars represent one
standard error of the mean. * p < .05, † p < .08.
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Appendix C
Reappraisal Instructions:
Please watch the following film clip carefully. This time, as you watch, try to think
about the situation you see in a more positive light. You can achieve this in several
different ways. For example, try to imagine advice that you could give to the
characters in the film clip to make them feel better. This could be advice that would
help them think about the positive bearing this event could have on their lives. Or,
think about the good things they might learn from this experience. Keep in mind that
even though a situation may be painful in the moment, in the long run, it could make
one’s life better, or have unexpected good outcomes. In other words, try to think
about the situation in as positive terms as you possibly can. This can be difficult at
times, so it is very important that you try your best. Please ask the research assistant if
you have questions about this task. It is very important that you carefully watch the
film clip, but think about it from a positive perspective.
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